Protecting Unionized Employees Against Discrimination: The Fourth Circuit\u27s Misinterpretation of Supreme Court Precedent by Hodges, Ann C.
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Law Faculty Publications School of Law
1998
Protecting Unionized Employees Against
Discrimination: The Fourth Circuit's
Misinterpretation of Supreme Court Precedent
Ann C. Hodges
University of Richmond, ahodges@richmond.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/law-faculty-publications
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ann C. Hodges, Protecting Unionized Employees Against Discrimination: The Fourth Circuit's Misinterpretation of Supreme Court
Precedent, 2 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol'y J. 123 (1998).
PROTECTING UNIONIZED EMPLOYEES AGAINST 
DISCRIMINATION: THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S 
MISINTERPRET A TI ON OF SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT 
BY 
ANN C. HODGES' 
The Supreme Court's 1991 decision in Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corporation1 initiated a barrage of employer ef-
forts to dismiss or stay employment discrimination actions in judicial 
forums based on contractual arbitration agreements. Many of the 
agreements that formed the basis of employer motions were in. the 
nonunion setting, but despite the Supreme Court's decision in Alex-
ander v. Gardner-Denver Company,' employers also have sought 
dismissal of discrimination claims based on the existence of grievance 
and arbitration procedures in collective bargaining agreements. The 
Fourth Circuit is the only circuit thus far to have dismissed employee 
discrimination claims on the basis of the employee's failure to arbi-
trate using a collectively bargained arbitration procedure.' The other 
circuits that have addressed the issue have refused to find that arbi-
tration provisions in collective bargaining agreements bar judicial 
' Professor of Law, University of Richmond; B.S., University of North Carolina, Chapel 
Hill; M.A., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; J.D., Northwestern University. Lisa R. 
Butler, J.D. 1998, and Tracey Watkins, Class of 1999, University of Richmond, provided valuable 
research assistance. I also am indebted to Irving M. Friedman, Katz, Friedman, Schur & Eagle, 
for his insightful advice and coinments on an earlier draft of this article and for his wise counsel 
throughout my career. 
I. 500 U.S. 20 (1991) . 
. 2. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). In Gardner-Denver, the Supreme Court held that an employee's 
cl~1m that his discharge violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act could proceed in court despite a 
pnor arbitration under the co11ective bargaining agreement in which the discharge was upheld. 
3. See Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 121 F.3d 702, 1997 WL 422869 (4th Cir. 
July 29, 1997) (unpublished opinion), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 1162 (1998); Austin v. Owens-
Br?ckway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 432 (1996). The 
Thir~ Circuit reached a similar result, but subsequently vacated and changed its decision. See 
Martin v. Dana Corp., 135 F.2d 765, 156 L.R.R.M. 3137 (3d Cir. 1997). The issue is not limited to 
fe~eral courts and employment discrimination claims. In July 1997, a circuit court in Virginia 
relted on Austin to dismissed an employee's claim that she was terminated in retaliation for filing 
a :workers' compensation claim in violation of state law. See Graham v. Northern Virginia Elec-
tric Cooperative, No. 41065 (1st Jud. Circ. 1997). 
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litigation of federal statutory claims.' The Supreme Court has 
granted certiorari in a Fourth Circuit case to resolve the split in the 
circuits.' 
The Fourth Circuit's approach to the issue misinterprets the law 
as set forth by the Supreme Court and demonstrates a lack of under-
standing of the operation of the grievance and arbitration procedure 
in the collective bargaining context. The decisions create great diffi-
culty for unions seeking to protect bargaining unit employees from 
discriminatory treatment. The Supreme Court should resolve this 
split in the circuits by reaffirming Gardner-Denver's holding that em-
ployees covered by a collective bargaining agreement can litigate dis-
crimination claims in federal court, whether or not they choose to 
avail themselves of the contractual grievance and arbitration proce-
dure. 
This article will first review the Supreme Court's arbitration ju-
risprudence, concentrating on labor and employment law cases. 
Next, the article will analyze the cases involving arbitration under 
collective bargaining agreements decided by the courts of appeals 
subsequent to Gilmer. The article will then evaluate the two differ-
ent approaches of the circuit courts in light of the law relating to 
collective bargaining and union representation. Finally, the article 
will review alternative methods of protecting employee rights to de-
termine whether unions can preserve employees' statutory rights un-
der the rule of the Fourth Circuit. The article concludes that the Su-
preme Court should reverse the Fourth Circuit in order to effectuate 
the purposes of both national labor policy and antidiscrimination 
law. · 
I. TH]:': SUPREME COURT'S ARBITRATION JURISPRUDENCE 
Since at least 1960, when it decided the Steelworkers Trilogy, 6 
4. See Harrison v. Eddy Potash, 112 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 66 
U.S.L.W. 3137 (U.S. Aug. 6.1997) (No. 97-232); Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354 (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 295 (1997); Penny v. United Parcel Service, 128 F.3d 408 {6th Cir. 
1997); Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 117 F.3d 519 (11th Cir. 1997); Martin v. Dana 
Corp., 156 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3137 {3d Cir. 1997); Varner v. National Super Mkts, Inc., 94 F.3d 
1209 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 946 (1997); Bates v. Long Island R.R. Co., 997 F.2d 
1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 992 (1993). 
5. Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 121 F.3d 702, 1997 WL 422869 (4th Cir. July 
29, 1997) (unpublished opinion), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 1162 (1998). 
6. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United 
Steelworkers v. American Mfg Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise 
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). 
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the Supreme Court has been solicitous of the arbitration of disputes 
arising under collectively bargained agreements. In the Trilogy, the 
Court affirmed the national labor policy favoring arbitration, limiting 
the court's function to deciding whether the parties had agreed to 
arbitrate the dispute and admonishing courts that "[a Jn order to arbi-
trate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be 
said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not suscep-
tible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts 
should be resolved in favor of coverage. "1 The Court also examined 
the judicial role in post-arbitration review of awards in the Trilogy, 
ruling that courts should not reevaluate the merits of an arbitrator's 
decision. The Court in the Trilogy recognized that labor arbitration 
is not a "substitute for litigation," but rather a "substitute for indus-
trial strife."8 Arbitration is not solely a method of resolving disputes 
between employees and the employer, but it is "an extension of the 
collective bargaining process, the method by which meaning and con-
tent are given to the negotiated agreement."' The arbitrator's func-
tion is to read the contract, effectively striking a supplemental bar-
gain for the parties to handle matters unanticipated at the time of 
negotiations."' 
For many years, the Court's deference to labor arbitration was 
uuique. In the 1980s, however, the Supreme Court issued a series of 
decisions enforcing commercial agreements to arbitrate statutory 
clairns.11 In the commercial context, the Court also concluded that 
doubts about the scope of an agreement to arbitrate should be re-
solved in favor of coverage." In 1991, the Court addressed arbitra-
tion of a statutory employment discrimination claim in Gilmer, 
7. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582-83. The Court also held that in determining arbitrability 
of a dispute, the courts should not weigh the inerits of the grievance, noting that the processing of 
even frivolous claims may have therapeutic value. American Mfg, 363 U.S. at 568. 
8. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 578. 
9. Ann C. Hodges, The Steelworkers Trilogy in the Public Sector, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
63!, 635 (1990). 
10. Theodore J. St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look 
at Enterprise Wheel and Its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REY.1137, 1140 (1977). 
11. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) {enforcing 
agreement to arbitrate claims under the Securities Act of 1933); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. 
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (enforcing agreement to _arbitrate claims under Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 and the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)); Mit-
subishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (enforcing agreement 
to ~rbitrate claims based on antitrust law). For a thorough discussion of the Supreme Court's 
~~-1~ration jurisprudence, see Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of the Law Is fVo Excuse: Judi-
u1JtiD.n..:..:"" • • • I •t;D·mr r Dn•1 AO 6'.l 7.1,(j_OQ'.7,),_,.-, 
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holding that the employee, who had agreed to arbitrate disputes re-
garding his employment in his registration application for the New 
York Stock Exchange, was required to arbitrate his statutory age 
discrimination claim despite his objections.13 Prior to the Gilmer de-
cision, however, the Court had addressed the impact of grievance ar-
bitration on a statutory Title VII claim in Gardner-Denver.
1
' 
The employee in Gardner-Denver filed suit under Title VII al-
leging that his discharge was because of his race." The employee had 
previously arbitrated his discharge under the just cause provision of 
the collective bargaining agreement between his employer and his 
union and had raised his claim of race discrimination in the arbitra-
tion. The arbitrator's decision denied the grievance, finding that the 
discharge was for just cause, but did not expressly address the issue 
of race discrimination. The district court and the court of appeals 
agreed with the employer's argument that the employee was bound 
by the arbitrator's decision and had no right to sue under Title VIL 
The Supreme Court upheld the employee's right to sue despite the 
arbitration decision, rejecting the argument that the employee had 
waived his cause of action under Title VIL The Court noted that 
while the union could waive statutory rights related to collective ac-
tivity, such as the right to strike, the union could not waive the indi-
vidual's statutory right to be free from discrimination through the 
collective bargaining process." Nor did the employee's submission 
of his grievance to the arbitration process waive his statutory right 
since the process was an indep~ndent method of enforcing a contrac-
tual, rather than a statutory obligation.17 The Court emphasized the 
latter.point by noting that the arbitrator's authority related only to 
contractual matters, not legislation, even if the contractual rights and 
the statutory rights were identical." 
Despite the national labor policy favoring arbitration, the Court 
reasoned that upholding the employee's right of access to a judicial 
forum would not unduly discourage arbitration. 1' Unlike commercial 
arbitration, which substitutes for litigation, labor arbitration is a sub-
stitute for the strike, providing a strong incentive for employers to 
13. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23. 
14. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 38. 
15. All facts have been taken from the Court's opinion in Gardner-Denver. Id. at 38-43. 
16. Id. al 51-52. 
17. Id. at 52. 
18. Id. at 53-54. 
19. Id. at 54. 
l 
t 
) 
:I 
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agree to arbitrate even if statutory claims can be the subject of later 
litigation.20 Furthermore, arbitration of the statutory claim might re-
solve the issue, rendering litigation unnecessary, although permissi-
ble.21 
The employer also urged the Court to rule that courts must de-
fer to an arbitrator's decision in later litigation, if such litigation were 
permitted." In addressing this argument, the Court concluded that 
arbitration was an inappropriate forum for resolution of Title VII 
claims." The Court supported this conclusion by pointing out that 
arbitrators have authority only to enforce collective bargaining 
agreements, not statutory claims, and that they are chosen because of 
their expertise in the "law of the shop, not the law of the land."24 
The Court went on to note that the informality of the arbitration 
procedure, including the inapplicability of the rules of evidence and 
the absence or liniited use of discovery, compulsory process, cross 
examination and testimony under oath, made arbitration a less ap-
propriate forum tlian the courts· for Title VII cases." In a footnote, 
the court also evinced concern for the fact that the union exclusively 
controlled the collectively-bargained grievance and arbitration pro-
cedure." The interests of the employee/discriminatee and the union 
might diverge and the union might subordinate the individual's in-
terest to the collective interests of the bargaining unit employees." 
The Court considered but rejected application of a more de-
manding deferral standard to resolve its concerns." A rule which 
would require arbitration to contain the safeguards of litigation for 
deferral purposes would reduce the benefits of arbitral informality, 
while necessitating more extensive judicial review of the arbitration 
decision to insure compliance with the standard, tliereby limiting the 
20. Id. at 55. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 55-56. The proposed deferral rule would have granted summary judgment for the 
em.player on the statutory claim, thereby dismissing the employee's action, if the discrimination 
claim was before the arbitrator, the collective bargaining agreement prohibited discrimination of 
the type alleged in the lawsuit, and the arbitrator had the authority to rule on the claim and order 
a remedy. Id. at 56. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 57. 
25. Id. at 57-58. 
26. Id. at58n.19. 
27. Id . 
. 28. Id. at 58. The Court cited as an example the standard adopted by the Fifth Circuit in 
Rios v. Reynolds Metals Co., 467 F.2d 54, 58 (1972). Id. at 58 n.20. 
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efficiency that a deferral rule would be designed to accomplish." 
The Court also reasoned that a deferral rule might discourage utiliza-
tion of arbitration, generating more, rather than less litigation.30 Ac-
cordingly, the Court concluded that "the federal policy favoring arbi-
tration of labor disputes and the federal policy against discriminatory 
employment practices could best be accommodated by permitting an 
employee to fully pursue both his remedy under the grievance-
arbitration clause of a collective- bargaining agreement and his cause 
of action under Title VII. "31 
In two subsequent cases, the Court reached the same conclusion 
with respect to claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act and Sec-
tion 1983.32 In Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys.," the Court 
relied on Gardn.er-Denver to find that employees were not barred 
from bringing a claim in federal court based on the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act, despite their prior arbitration of their wage claims under 
the collective bargaining agreement." Like the Court in Gardner-
Denver, the Barrentine Court recognized the risk to statutory rights 
were they relegated to enforcement through a collectively bargained 
grievance and arbitration procedure." Similarly, the Court noted 
that an arbitrator expert in the law of the shop might not have the le-
gal expertise or the authority to decide statutory claims." Finally, 
the Court pointed out that the arbitrator could award only the relief 
available under the contract, which was unlikely to include the liqui-
dated damages, costs and attorney's fees available under the FLSA." 
Again in McDonald v. City of West Branch," the Court evinced 
29. Id. •t 59. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 59-60. 
32. See McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (Section 1983); Barrentine v. 
Arkansas-Best Freight System, 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (Fair Labor Standards Act). Section 1983, 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), provides inter alia: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, 
of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, 
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured 
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 
The plaintiff in McDonald, a public employee, sued under Section 1983 alleging that his termina-
tion violated his first amendment rights. 
33. 450 U.S. 728 (1981). 
34. Id. at 745-46. 
35. Id. at 744-45. 
36. Id. at 743. The concern about expertise was particularly acute in Barrentine which in-
volved a joint arbitration board composed of union and management representatives. Id. at 731. 
37. Id. at 745. 
38. 466 U.S. 284 (1984). 
' 
, 
:f 
l-
,7 
~ v. 
183, 
,d.na-
:h in~ 
j731. 
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a concern about the union's exclusive control over the grievance pro-
cedure, highlighting the possibility that the union "may present the 
employee's grievance less vigorously, or make different strategic 
choices than would the employee. Thus, where an arbitration award 
accorded preclusive effect, an employee's opportunity to be compen-
sated for a constitutional deprivation might be lost merely because it 
was not in the union's interest to press his claim vigorously ."
39 
These three cases preceded the Supreme Court's decision in 
Gilmer, where the Court distinguished them in ordering Gilmer to 
arbitrate his age discrimination claim.40 Relying on the recent deci-
sions in commercial arbitration cases, the Court found that the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) did not bar waiver of 
the right to a judicial forum, and also rejected the argument that ar-
bitration is not an adequate forum for resolving statutory claims.
41 
The Court concluded that the plaintiff's reliance on Gardner-Denver 
and its progeny was misplaced. 
First, those cases did not involve the issue of the enforceability of 
an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims. Rather, they involved 
the qnite different issue whether arbitration of contract-based 
claims precluded subsequent judicial resolution of statutory claims. 
Since the employees there had not agreed to arbitrate their statu-
tory claims, and the labor arbitrators were not authorized to re-
solve such claims, the arbitration in those cases understandably was 
held not to preclude subsequent statutory actions. Second, because 
the arbitration in those cases occurred in the context of a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement, the claimants were represented by their 
unions in the arbitration proceedings. An important concern 
therefore was the tension between collective representation and 
individual statutory rights, a concern not applicable to the present 
case. Finally, those cases were not decided under the FAA, which 
as discussed above, reflects a "liberal federal policy favoring arbi-
t 
. a 
ration agreements." 
Since Gilmer, courts have regularly enforced agreements to arbi-
trate statutory employment discrimination claims in the nonunion 
context." The courts have split, however, on whether the existence 
39, Id. at 291. 
40. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33-35. 
41. Id. at 29-30. 
42. Id. at 35. 43. See, e.g., Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971F.2d698 (11th Cir. 1992); Mago v. 
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1992); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 
Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir.1991); see also Metz v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc, 39 F.3~ 1482 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding Title VII claims arbitrable but finding that employer waived ~rb1tration in this case); but see Prudential Corp. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994), wt denied, ~<:· 16.U.S. 812 (1995) (holding that the employees did not knowingly and voluntarily waive their 
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of arbitration provisions in collective bargaining agreements bars ju-
dicial litigation of statutory claims. A review of those cases demon-
strates the opposing views. 
II. POST-GILMER LOWER COURT DECISIONS INVOLVING 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS 
In addition to a number of district courts, seven circuits have 
faced the question of the impact of a collective bargaining agree-
ment's arbitration clause on a statutory discrimination action. The 
Fourth Circuit stands alone in dismissing discrimination complaints 
based on arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements, 
while the Second, Third, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh have 
rejected employer motions to dismiss or stay judicial claims. 
A. The Fourth Circuit 
In Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc.,44 the Fourth 
Circuit issued the first and most definitive circuit court of appeals de-
cision dismissing the plaintiff's claim where she failed to invol<e the 
grievance and arbitration procedure of the collective bargaining 
agreement. The majority in Austin began by citing the federal policy 
favoring arbitration of labor disputes." It then focused primarily on 
Gilmer and looked to Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities 
Act to discern whether Congress intended to preclude waiver of ju-
dicial remedies.46 Since bo'th the ADA and the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, amending Title VII, contained language encouraging the use of 
alfernative dispute resolution, the court found no such intent." 
While recognizing that the legislative history of both statutes focused 
on voluntary use of ADR, the court both disregarded the authority 
of the legislative history and suggested that the case at bar involved 
voluntary arbitration.48 The court dismissed the Supreme Court's 
right to a judicial forum for litigation of discrimination claims); Rosenberg, v. Merrill, Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 76 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. {BNA) 681 (D. Mass. 1998) (Congress did 
not intend to permit compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims and the arbitral forum at issue 
was inadequate to resolve the plaintiff's ADEA claim). 
44. 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir.), cat. denied, 117 S. Ct. 432 (1996). 
45. Id. at 879. 
46. Id. at 880-82. 
47. Id. at 881. But see Rosenberg, 76 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (ENA) at 690-94 (concluding 
that Congress did not intend to permit mandatory predispute agreements to arbitrate Title VII 
claims). 
48. 78 F.3d at 885-86. 
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concern m Gilmer about tension between individual and collective 
rights, finding that the plaintiff was a party to the collective bargain-
ing agreement through which she voluntarily agreed to arbitrate.49 
To the court, it made no difference whether the agreement to arbi-
trate was contained in an employment contract, a securities registra-
tion application, or a collective bargaining agreement." 
To further support its decision, the Austin court cited the ability 
of a union to waive employee rights protected by the National Labor 
Relations Act.51 The court found no distinction between such a 
waiver and bargaining for arbitration which waived the individual's 
right to a judicial forum.52 Finally, the court also relied on judicial 
decisions under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act 
requiring employees to exhaust the grievance and arbitration proce-
dure prior to filing suit against the employer." Judge Hall dissented, 
relying on the continued vitality of Gardner-Denver, which according 
to Judge Hall governs arbitration of statutory claims in the context of 
collective bargaining agreements." · 
Since Austin, the Fourth Circuit has twice addressed the issue. 
First, in Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corporation, the court 
relied on Austin to dismiss an employee's Americans with Disabili-
ties Act claim against a group of employers who were members of an 
employer association.55 Although there was a grievance and arbitra-
tion procedure in the collective bargaining agreement, Wright did 
not file a grievance.56 In an unpublished opinion, the court upheld 
the district court''s dismissal of the claim based on the broad lan-
guage of the grievance and arbitration agreement.57 Since the con-
tract stated that "this agreement is intended to cover all matters af-
fecting wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment," the court concluded that the absence of any language 
referring to the ADA or statutory disability discrimination claims did 
not preclude dismissal based on failure to arbitrate.58 "An employer 
49. Id. at 885. 
50. Id. 
51. Id., citing Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 705 (1983). 
52. Id. at 885. 
53. Id., citing Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965). The case cited in-
volved suits for breach of the collective bargaining agreement. 
54. Id. at 886-87 (Hall, J. dissenting). 
55. 121 F.3d 702 (table), 1997 WL 422869 (4th Cir. July 29, 1997) (unpublished opinion), 
cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 1162 (1998). 
56. Id. at *1. 
57. Id. at *2. 
58. Id. 
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need not provide a laundry list of potential disputes in order for 
them to be covered by an arbitration clause. . . . A narrower inter-
pretation of the agreement would fly directly in the face of both the 
ADA's statutory preference for arbitration, and the strong federal 
policy favoring alternative dispute resolution (citations omitted)."59 
Several months later, the court again addressed the issue in a 
case arising under the Railway Labor Act."' The Fourth Circuit re-
versed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's Title VII and the 
Family and Medical Leave Act claims based on Austin.61 The court 
distinguished the case from Austin, holding that the collective bar-
gaining agreement's arbitration provision did not cover statutory 
disputes; instead it was limited to contractual disputes." The con-
tractual prohibition of conduct similar to that prohibited by Title VII 
and the FMLA was insufficient to create an obligation to arbitrate 
statutory claims, according to the court.63 In accordance with the 
earlier decision in Wright, however, the court stated that the parties 
could agree to arbitrate disputes based on statutory and common law 
claims and "would not need to mention in their agreement that a 
statute was the source of a dispute committed to arbitration as long 
as it were made clear that their agreement is sufficiently broad to in-
clude the arbitration of such disputes. "64 
Accordingly, in the Fourth Circuit, either contractual reference 
to statutory rights or broad language indicating that the contract cov-
ers more than just contractual rights will bind employees to arbitrate 
statutory claims. In contrast to lhe Fourth Circuit, each of the other 
circuits has relied on the continuing viability of Gardner-Denver to 
reject employer efforts to compel arbitration of statutory claims un-
der collective bargaining agreements. 
B. The Second Circuit 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals refused to dismiss a claim 
of disability discrimination .under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
based on the Railway Labor Act's requirement that minor disputes 
59. Id. 
60. Brown v. Trans World Airlines, 127 F.3d 337 {4th Cir.1997). 
61. Id. at 338. The court, however, found that Brown failed to rebut facts showing that she 
had no claim under the FMLA and upheld summary judgment on that cause of action on the 
merits. Id. at 342. 
62. Id. at 341. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at341-42. 
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be arbitrated." Although the court recognized that the claims impli-
cated the collective bargaining agreement, it relied on Gardner-
Denver, Barrentine and McDonald to find that the employees were 
entitled to proceed in court.66 Gilmer did not apply, according to the 
court, because the Federal Arbitration Act excludes contracts of rail-
road employees, and, in addition, Gilmer did not involve a collective 
bargaining agreement." The court's decision, however, seemed to 
rely in part on the inadequacy of the arbitration forum for the reso-
lution of statutory claims, a rationale rejected in Gilmer. 68 
Two years later, the Second Circuit again addressed the arbitra-
tion of statutory claims in Tran v. Tran." In that case, the court re-
lied on Barrentine to reverse the district court's determination that 
the employee was required to "exhaust his arbitral remedy prior to 
filing" suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act.70 The court con-
cluded that Barrentine not only survived Gilmer, but indeed had' re-
newed vitality based on the Gilmer Court's distinction of the cases . 
involving arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement.
71 
C. The Eighth Circuit 
In Varner v. National Super Markets, Inc.,72 the Eighth Circuit 
upheld the district court's denial of the employer's motion for judg-
ment as a matter of law based on the plaintiff's failure to exhaust the 
65. Bates v. Long Island R.R. Co., 997 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 992 
(1993). The Railway Labor Act provides that minor disputes, disputes about the interpretation 
of collective bargaining agreements, must be resolved exclusively by the statutory arbitration 
procedure. Id. at 1034. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. See id. at 1030-32. In a subsequent case, the District Court of Connecticut concluded 
that the plaintiff must arbitrate his claims of race discrimination under § 1981 because the collec-
tive bargaining agreement prohibited "discrimination as defined by federal law and provide(d] 
for arbitration of any violation." Almonte v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 959 F. Supp. 569, 573-74 (D. 
Conn. 1997). The court relied on its prior decision in Claps v, Moliterno Stone Sales, Inc., 819 F. 
Supp. 141 (D. Conn. 1993), in which it established a rebuttable presumption that statutory clailns 
were excluded from the collective bargaining process, but found the presumption rebutted in Al-
monte. 959 F. Supp. at 574. The Almonte court neither discussed Bates nor distinguished Al-
n1onte from Bates. 
69. 54 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 1995). cert. den;ed, 517 U.S. 1134 (1996). 
70. Id. at 118, quoting Tran v, Tran, 847 F. Supp. at 309, The Ninth Circuit reached a similar 
conclusion in a Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) case, which suggests that it would reach the 
same conclusion with respect to discrimination claims. See Local 246, Utility Workers v. South-
ern Cal. Edison Co., 83 F.3d 292 (9th Cir. 1996). On the other hand, discrimination claims may 
be distinguished from FLSA claims based on the absence of statutory language in the FLSA en-
couraging alternative dispute resolution. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
71. 54 F.3d at 117. 
72, 94 F.3d 1209, 1213 (8th Cir. 1996). cert. den;ed, 117 S. Ct. 946 (1997). 
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collective bargaining agreement's grievance and arbitration proce-
dure before filing a Title VII sexual harassment case. The court, 
with little discussion, relied on Gardner-Denver to hold that exhaus-
tion was not required. Later, in Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, the 
court reiterated, in dicta, that "arbitration agreements contained 
within a CBA do not bar civil claims under Title VII."
73 
D. The Seventh Circuit 
While the Second and Eighth Circuits followed the Gardner-
Denver line of cases with limited analysis, the Seventh Circuit en-
gaged in a far more extensive analytical review before concluding 
that the availability of arbitration under a collective bargaining 
agreement did not require the court to stay judicial litigation of statu-
tory claims.74 The consolidated case involved two plaintiffs, one al-
leging race discrimination under Title VII and Section 1981 and dis-
ability discrimination under the ADA and the second alleging age 
and disability discrimination under the ADEA and ADA respec-
tively. Each was covered by a collective bargaining agreement which 
prohibited discrimination, required just cause for termination, and 
contained a grievance and arbitration procedure for disputes in-
volving interpretation and application of the agreement.75 One plain-
tiff's union had demanded arbitration of his grievance, while the 
other's union had dropped the grievance." First, the court addressed 
the question of whether the Federal Arbitration Act encompasses 
collective bargaining agreements, noting that the question was criti-
cal in determining the court's jurisdiction.77 The court decided that 
the contract was not excluded from the FAA, since the statutory ex-
clusion applied only to "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad 
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or inter-
state commerce."78 On this issue, which has split the courts, the Sev-
enth Circuit agreed with those courts who read the exclusion nar-
rowly to encompass only employment contracts in the transportation 
73. 113 F.3d 832 (1997). 
74. Pryner v. Tractor Supply Company, 109 F.3d 354 (7th Or.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 294 
(1997). 
75. One contractual antidiscrimination clause referred to state and federal law while the 
other did not. Id. at 356. 
76. There was some dispute as to whether the grievance was dropped as a result of the em-
ployee's actions or the union's. Id. 
77. Id. at 356-60. 
78. Id. 
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industry." The court then reached the second issue of whether a 
collective bargaining agreement can compel arbitration of a federal 
statutory discrimination claim. 
Noting that resolution of the issue involved balancing "the in-
terest in allowing unions and employers to establish a comprehensive 
regime for the adjustment of employment disputes"80 and the 
"interest in the effective enforcement of rights designed for the pro-
tection of workers"81 in vulnerable groups, the court concluded that 
the appropriate balance was to allow judicial litigation despite the 
collective bargaining agreement's arbitration provision. Therefore, 
the court denied the requested stay. Despite the employers' at-
tempts to convince the court that a stay pending arbitration would 
benefit both the employers and the employees, the court found that 
the employees might well lose statutory rights were they required to 
submit their claims to arbitration, even if later judicial litigation were 
. d 82 perm1tte . 
The court offered three reasons supporting the balance it struck. 
First, because the employees' rights under the collective bargaining 
agreements were more limited than their statutory rights, they might 
be required to litigate twice in order to obtain complete relief." Sec-
ond, by arbitrating their claims, the employees would lose the right 
to trial by jury.84 Finally, as the Supreme Court recognized in both 
Gilmer and Gardner-Denver, the union controls the grievance and 
arbitration procedure.85 While the duty of fair representation re-
quires the union to represent the employee nondiscriminatorily and 
in good faith, the union has broad discretion in determining whether 
to arbitrate a grievance." Even if the duty is breached, the employee 
must then file another lawsuit to vindicate his or her statutory 
rights."7 Accordingly, it is inconsistent with the policy underlying the 
employment discrimination statutes to allow the statutory rights of 
the minority to be controlled by the majority." Forcing arbitration 
79. 1'L at 357-58. 
80. Id. at 360. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 361. 
83. Id. at 362. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Id.; see Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186 (1967). Charges of breach of the duty of fair r~presentation can also be filed with the National Labor Relations Board in lieu of judicial litiga-
hon. Id. 
88. Pryner, 109 F.3d at 363. 
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under the collective bargaining agreement allows the union 
(representing the majority) to waive the employees' individual rights 
to a judicial forum to vindicate their statutory rights.89 
E. The Tenth Circuit 
Less than two months after Pryner, the Tenth Circuit decided 
that judicial litigation of a Title VII sexual harassment claim was not 
barred by the plaintiff's failure to file a grievance under the collective 
bargaining agreement." The court concluded that Gilmer distin-
guished arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement from in-
dividual arbitration agreements because of the concern about con-
flicts between group goals and individual rights.91 Labor arbitrators 
interpret the agreement (private law), while employment arbitrators 
deciding statutory claims determine public law rights.
92 
In addition, 
the court suggested that Gilmer did not apply outside the context of 
the FAA, which the Tenth Circuit had held does not cover labor ar-
bitration because of the Section 1 exclusion." Accordingly, Gardner-
Denver was the appropriate authority rather than Gilmer, requiring 
rejection of the Defendant's argument." 
F. The Third Circuit 
The Third Circuit, addressing the issue just over a month after 
the Tenth Circuit, dismis~ing the plaintiff's race discrimination claim 
brought under Title VII and Section 1981 because he failed to utilize 
the collective bargaining agreement's arbitration procedure." Upon 
89. Id. at 362-63. 
90. Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 66 
U.S.L.W. 3137 (U.S. Aug. 6, 1997) (No. 97-232). 
91. Id. at 1453-54. 
92. Id. at 1454, citing Martin H. Malin, Arbitrating Statutory Employment Claims in the Af-
termath of Gilmer, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 77, 87-88 (1996). The court noted that it did not have 
evidence regarding the scope of the arbitration clause, but that no argument had been put forth 
that the agreement covered statutory claims. 112 F.3d at 1454 n.2. This caveat may suggest thal 
the court would reach a different conclusion if the contract specifically incorporated statutory 
claims under the arbitration provision. Cf Martin v. Dana Corp., 135 F.3d 765, 156 L.R.R.M. 
(BNA) 3137 (3d Cir. 1997). 
93. 112 F.3d at 1454. 
94. Id. 
95. Martin v. Dana Corp., 114 F.3d 421 (1997), vacated, 114 F.3d 428 (3d Ch. 1997). On 
July 1, 1997, the court voted to rehear the case en bane. 114 F.3d 428. On September 12, how-
ever, the court vacated that order and referred the case back to the panel for rehearing. 124 F.3<l 
590. In its initial opinion, the Third Circuit concluded that the facts of the Martin case differed 
from cases previously addressed by the courts in the labor arbitration context because the em- ~ 
ployee individually could compel arbitration. Accordingly, the concern about conflicting individ- ~i ; 
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rehearing, the same panel, in an unpublished opinion, concluded 
without dissent that because the union maintained exclusive control 
over the grievance procedure, Alexander. v. Gardner-Denver required 
reversal of the district court's order dismissing the complaint for fail-
ure to arbitrate. 96 
G. The Eleventh Circuit 
In Brisentine v. Stone & Weber Engineering Corp.,
91 
the Elev-
enth Circuit followed the majority view and reversed the district 
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer. The 
employee had filed an ADA claim challenging his termination with 
the EEOC and subsequently in court, eschewing the contractual 
grievance procedure on the advice of the union." The district court · 
dismissed Brisentine's ADA claim because of his failure to file a 
grievance under the collectively bargained procedure." On review, 
the Eleventh Circuit, like the Tenth Circuit, concluded that Gardner-
Denver was still good law and looked to the Gilmer Court's distinc-
tion between the two cases to determine whether the case at bar 
more closely resembled Gilmer or Gardner-Denver.
100 
The court tested the facts of Brisentine against the three distinc-
tions the Supreme Court drew between Gilmer and Gardner-Denver. 
First, as in Gardner-Denver, the collective bargaining agreement in 
Brisentine authorized the arbitrator to interpret only the contract, 
not statutory claims. '01 Second, in both cases there was a potential 
ual and group interests was not present and the court determined that Gilmer, rather than Gard-
_ner-Denver controlled. The court supported its decision by noting another "determinative fac-
tor"-the language of the collective bargaining agreement explicitly provided for arbitration of 
<-_statutory discrimination claims. Id. at *21. The agreement stated: 
Any and all claims regarding equal employment opportunity provided for under this 
Agreement or under any federal, state or local fair employment practice law shall be 
exclusively addressed by an individual employee or the Union under the grievance and 
;-:·.· arbitration provision of this Agreement. l1· A ~trong dissent by Judge Scirica argued that the union could not waive the employee's statu-
.fJ nghts, particularly where the waiver precluded a jury trial. Id. at *25-26. 
96. 135 F.3d 765, 156 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3137, 3139 (3d Cir. 1997). 
>97. 117F.3d519(11thCir.1997). 
/' 98. Id. at 521. The union representative told Brisentine that because his dispute "centered 
,ound. his disability, he would be better off filing a complaint with the Equal Employment Op-
rtumty Commission ("EEOC") instead of pursuing his claim through the grievance proce-
re." Id. 
' 99. Id. 
.100. Id. at 522-26. 
l01,. Id. at 524. The court found the agreements "materially identical" since both confined arb1trat~r's jurisdiction to determining the interpretation of the agreement and both specified 
i.t the arbitrator had no authority to alter the contractual provisions. Id. 
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for differing interests between the union and the employee with re-
spect to the arbitration of statutory claims.102 Third, in Brisentine like 
Gardner-Denver, the claim did not arise under the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act.10' 
Having concluded that the case closely resembled Gardner-
Denver, the court stated "[u]nless and until the Supreme Court over-
rules [Gardner-Denver], we are bound to apply that decision to a 
case like this one that involves an exclusive remedy arbitration clause 
in a collective bargaining agreement under which the arbitrator is 
limited to resolving contractual claims, and the employee-claimant is 
not empowered to insist that his claim be arbitrated."
104 
The court 
noted its disagreement with the contrary conclusion of the Fourth 
Circuit majority in Austin, stating that the reasoning of the dissent 
was more persuasive."' Finally, the court set forth a three factor test 
for determining whether an arbitration clause bars litigation of a 
statutory claim: 
[A] mandatory arbitration clause does not bar litigation of a fed-
eral statutory claim, unless three requirements are met. First, the 
employee must have agreed individually to the contract containing 
the arbitration clause-the union having agreed for the employee 
during collective bargaining does not count. Second, the agree-
ment must authorize the arbitrator to resolve federal statutory 
claims-it is uot enough that the arbitrator can resolve contract 
claims, eveu if factual issues arising from those claims overlap with 
the statutory claim issues. Third, the agreement must give the em-
ployee the right to insist on arbitration if the federal statutory 
claim is not resolved to his sati~factiou in any grievance process.106 
H. The Sixth Circuit 
The Sixth Circuit is the most recent circuit to weigh in on the 
debate over arbitration of statutory claims under the collective bar-
102. In support of this conclusion, the court noted the union's advice to Brisentine to file an 
EEOC charge rather than a grievance, suggesting that such advice might reflect a lack of enthu-
siasm for litigating his statutory claim in the gdevance procedure. Id. at 525. The court noted that 
not only could Bdsentine not force arbitration of his claim, but also his union did not control that 
decision. Id. Rather· a- council of unions made the determination and the cost of arbitration, 
borne by the union, might provide an incentive to decline to arbitrate. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 526. 
105. Id. See discussion of Austin supra notes 44-54 and accompanying text. The court also 
noted that the case was factually distinguishable from Martin. See discussion of Martin, supra 
notes 95-96 and accompanying text. 
106. Brisentine, 117 F.3d at 526-27. 
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gaining agreement.107 After considering the analysis of the other cir-
cuits that have dealt with the question, the Sixth Circuit concluded 
that "an employee whose only obligation to arbitrate is contained in 
a collective bargaining agreement retains the right to obtain a judi-
cial determination of his rights under a statute such as the ADA."
108 
The court concluded that Gilmer did not affect the holding of the 
Court in Gardner-Denver that the union could not waive an individ-
ual's statutory right to litigate in a judicial forum. 10' 
I. District Courts 
In those circuits which have not addressed the issue, district 
courts have reached differing results, some following the Austin ra-
tionale and others rejecting it. In the First Circuit, the Massachusetts 
District Court expressly declined to follow Austin in Lachance v. 
Northeast Publishing, Inc.,1 10 noting "[l]astly, and most importantly, I 
think the Fourth Circuit erred in failing to address the Supreme 
Court's recognition of the continuing viability of Gardner-
Denver."111 
Texas courts addressing the issue have reached differing results. 
In Dickerson v. United Parcel Service, the court ordered plaintiff's 
claimed stayed pending arbitration of his ADA claims under the 
collective bargaining agreement, which referenced the statute.
112 
In 
Hill v. American National Can Co. ,11' the court adopted the magis-
trate judge's recommendation to deny the employer's motion to dis-
miss plaintiff's AD A claim based on failure to exhaust the .collec-
tively-bargained grievance procedure, although the agreement 
107. Penny v. United Parcel Serv., 128 F.3d 408 (6th Cir. 1997). 
108. Id. at 413. 
'.,-, 109. Id. at 414. The Sixth Circuit expressly rejected the analysis of the Fourth Circuit in Aus-
tin. Id. 
110. 965 F. Supp.177 (D. Mass.1997). 
111. Id. at 189. Subsequently, the same court concluded in a case involving a New York 
tock Exchange (NYSE) arbitration agreement that Congress intended to preclude enforcement 
mandatory, pre-dispute arbitration agreements in Title VII cases. Rosenberg v. Merrill, 
ynch, Pierce, Fenner & Sinith, Inc., 76 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 681 (D. Mass. 1998). The 
_ourt f~rther determined that "the employer's structural dominance of the NYSE arbitration 
akes it an inadequate forum for the vindication of civil rights claims .... " Id. at 699. In one 
. se, the First Circuit addressed the question of whether claims under the ADA and state anti-
rimination law were preempted by the collective bargaining agreement which provided a 
evance and arbitration procedure. Ralph v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 135 F.3d 166 {1st Cir. 
,,98). The court rejected the employer's preemption argument, noting that statutory righls exist 
ependently of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 171. 
112. 154 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2471 (N.D. Tex. 1996). 
yl13. 952 F. Supp. 398 (N.D. Tex. 1996 ). 
140 EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL [Vol. 2:123 
specified that it would be administered in accordance with the AD A. 
The magistrate's opinion relied on the vitality of Gardner-Denver, 
concluding that the individual's statutory rights were not waived by 
the collective bargaining agreement.114 A third Texas district court 
agreed with the magistrate in Hill, declining to follow the Austin ra-
tionale.115 
In the Ninth Circuit, a California district court rejected Austin, 
concluding that it incorrectly interpreted the Supreme Court's juris-
prudence and ignored the important distinction between individual 
arbitration agreements and collective bargaining agreements."' The 
Idaho District Court concluded that a union was not required to ar-
bitrate FLSA claims before bringing suit, relying on Barrentine and 
distinguishing Austin. 111 Notably, however, the Ninth Circuit had 
previously determined that employees need not arbitrate FLSA 
claims under a collective bargaining agreement because the statutory 
provisions "are guarantees to individual workers that may not be 
waived through collective bargaining.""' This decision may presage 
the Ninth Circuit's position on the arbitration of discrimination 
claims. 
Having reviewed the divergent approaches of the courts to arbi-
tration of statutory claims under collective bargaining agreements, 
the next step is the analysis of these approaches under the existing 
law of collective bargaining and nondiscrimination. 
Ill. GARDNER-DENVER SURVIVES GILMER 
As most of the courts of appeals have recognized, Gilmer ex-
pressly distinguished Gardner-Denver rather than overruling it, ei-
114. Id. at 402-08. 
115. Bush v. Carrier Air Conditioning, 940 F. Supp. 1040, 1045-46 (E.D. Tex. 1996). The 
United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana distinguished Austin in refus-
ing to dismiss a Title VII claim. Bynes v. Ahrenkiel Ship Management, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 485 
(W.D. La. 1996). The court decided that since the plaintiffs could not compel arbitration and the 
union had dropped their grievance, they had exhausted any arbitration opportunity and could 
proceed in court. Id. at 487. 
116. Buckley v. Gallo Sales Co., 949 F. Supp. 737, 743 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 
117. Albertson's, Inc. v. United Food & Co1nmercial Workers, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4554 
(D. Idaho March 10, 1997). 
118. Local 246 Utility Workers Union v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 83 F.3d 292, 297 (9th Cir. 
1996). Subsequent to the completion of this article, the Ninth Circuit ruled in Duffield v. Robert-
son Stephens & Co., 76 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1450 (9th Circuit 1998) that Congress in-
lended to prohibit compulsory _arbitration of Title VII claims. While Duffield did not involve a 
collectively-bargained arbitration agreement, it would appear to apply in that context, particu-
larly because the court criticized the Fourth Circuit's analysis in Austin. 
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ther implicitly or explicitly."' At most, the Gilmer Court rejected 
Gardner-Denver's mistrust of arbitration as a vehicle for resolving 
statutory claims.120 The remaining rationale of Gardner-Denver, as 
explicated in Gilmer, provides a persuasive argument for reversing 
the Fourth Circuit's decision in Wright. 
121 
The Gardner-Denver Court recognized that labor arbitration 
under a collective bargaining agreement differs from arbitration of 
individual contractual or statutory claims. Because labor arbitration 
substitutes for the strike, not for litigation, it is an extension of the 
collective bargaining process. As a result, it is controlled by the un-
ion and great deference is given to the union's decisions regarding 
whether and how to arbitrate,122 and to the arbitrator's decision.
123 
This deference furthers the federal labor policy of encouraging col-
lective bargaining and peaceful resolution of labor disputes, but it is 
not designed to vindicate employees' statutory rights. 
Because of these differences between labor arbitration and indi-
vidual arbitration of statutory claims, construing arbitration clauses 
in collective bargaining agreements to waive individual statutory 
119. See Gilnier, 500 U.S. at 33-5. 
120. Id. at 34 n.5 . 
121. While this article focuses on the continuing viability of Gardner-Denver and the distinc-
tion between individual agreements to arbitrate and collective bargaining agreements, there ar_e 
other bases on which the Supreme Court might rule. There is a strong argument that the Fedcithl 
Arbitration Act does not cover arbitration provisions in collective bargaining agreements. The 
courts of appeals have disagreed on this issue. Cf Pryner, 109 F.3d at 377 (FAA excludes from 
coverage only employment contracts in the transportation industry); Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1454 
(FAA does not cover collective bargaining agreements.) The Fourth Circuit in Austin noted 
prior circuit precedent holding that the FAA does not apply to collective bargaining agreements, 
but relied on the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes as expressed in the Steel-
workers Trilogy to support its decision. 78 F.3d at 879-81. Wright relied on Austin. Thus, it is not 
clear that the Supreine Court will resolve the issue of the scope of the FAA in Wright. Professor 
Stone argues that the Fourth Circuit could only be relying on the FAA since Section 301 preemp-
tion is only available to require arbitration of state law claims. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, 
Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Eniployment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, ·7~ DENY. U. L. REV. 1017, 1035 (1996). For a thorough discussion of the FAA's Section 1 exclu-
sion, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994), see Matthew W. Finkin, Workers' Contracts Under the United States Ar-
;·. ·:bitration Act: An Essay in Historical Clarification, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 282 (1996); 
'see also Richard A. Bales, The Discord Between Collective Bargaining and Individual Employ-
ment Rights: Theoretical Origins and a Proposed Solution, 77 B.U. L. REV. 687, 731-42 (1997); 
Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine and Policy in the 
0;Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. l, 15-28 (1996). 
\./ · . !he Court might also conclude that the AD A evidences an intent to preclude waiver of the JUdici~l forum. There is substantial support in the legislative history for such a conclusion. See 
.<:Jrodm, supra at 30-32; Ann C. Hodges, The Americans with Disabilities Act in the Unionized 
.. 0 rkplace, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 567, 621~25 (1994). Given the Court's contrary ruling in Gilmer 
th respect to the ADEA, however, such a result seems unlikely. 
·; · 122. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). 
123. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). 
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rights is inconsistent with both the goals of national labor policy and 
the goals of antidiscrimination statutes.
124 
A. Finding Union Waivers of Employee Statutory Rights is 
Inconsistent with National Labor Policy and Statutory 
Nondiscrimination Rights 
A key distinction between the Fourth Circuit's decisions barring 
litigation based on the collective bargaining agreement's arbitration 
clause and the contrary decisions of the other circuits is the courts' 
conclusion regarding the union's authority to waive employee statu-
tory rights. The Fourth Circuit determined that because a union can 
waive employee rights provided in the National Labor Relations 
Act, such as the right to strike,"' the union can also waive the right to 
a judicial forum, including the right to a jury trial under Title VII 
and other discrimination laws. Gardner-Denver suggests otherwise. 
It is true, of course, that a uuion may waive certain statutory rights 
related to collective activity, such as the right to strike .... These 
rights are conferred on employees collectively to foster the proc-
esses of bargaining and properly may be exercised or relinquished 
by the union as the collective-bargaining ageut to obtain economic 
benefits for union members. Title VU, ou the other haud, stands 
on a plainly different ground; it concerns not majoritariau proc-
esses, but an individual's right to equal employment opportunities. 
Title Vll's strictures are absolute and represent a congressional 
command that each employee be free from discriminatory prac-
tices. Of necessity, the ·rights conferred can form no part of the 
collective-bargaining process since waiver of these rights would de-
feat the paramount congressional purpose behind Title VII. In 
these circumstances, an employee's rights under Title VII are uot 
susceptible of prospective waiver.
126 
124. This article takes no position on whether arbitration of statutory claims is appropriate or 
effective in nonunion settings. For further discussion of the arguments favoring and opposing 
such arbitration, see the authorities cited supra note 121 and infra notes 126, 166, 198, 201. See 
also Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims: Rights "Waived" and Lost in the Arbi-
tration Forum, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 381, 383184 (1996); Walter J. Gershenfeld, Pre-
employment Dispute Arbitration Agreements: Yes, No and Maybe, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 245 
(1996). 
125. 29u.s.c.§163 (1994). 126. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 51-52 (citations omitted). Although this language might be 
read as precluding an individual waiver as well as a waiver by the union, the subsequent decision 
in Gilmer makes clear than an individual can agree prospectively to arbitrate statutory discrimi-
nation claims. Professor Samuel Estreicher argued persuasively in Arbitration of Employrnent 
Disputes Without Unions, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 753, 781 (1990), written before Gilmer was de-
cided, that "the Gardner-Denver line of authority is best understood in terms of the collective 
bargaining agent's lack of authority to compromise individual employee entitlements flowing 
from extra-contractual sources." 
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The Gilmer Court determined that the employee could know-
ingly and voluntarily waive the right to a judicial forum for litigation 
of statutory claims, but it did not reject the Gardner-Denver Court's 
analysis regarding union waiver. Indeed, while the Gilmer Court did 
not expressly discuss union waiver, the concern expressed in Gard-
ner-Denver underlay the Gilmer Court's distinction of that case, 
which focused on the potential conflicts between collective rights and 
individual rights.127 A thorough analysis of the relevant labor law 
and antidiscrimination cases will demonstrate why finding a union 
waiver of employee statutory rights is inconsistent with both. 
( 
l. Unions Cannot Waive Individual Statutory Rights Because of 
Potential Conflicts of Interest 
As noted by the Gardner-Denver Court, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that unions can waive employees' statutory rights uhder 
the NLRA so long as the waiver is clear and unmistakable."' Such 
waivers are permissible because the union was freely selected to rep-
resent the employees and is governed by the doctrine of fair repre-
sentation."' The Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between 
economic rights and rights that relate to the choice of bargaining rep-
resentative."0 The former can be waived while the latter carmot be-
cause, in the latter situation, the union has a self interest which might 
lead to a waiver that is not in the interest of the employees.131 This 
point was emphasized by Justice Stewart concurring in part and dis-
senting in part, in Magnavox."' "Although the union is deemed to 
represent all employees in the bargaining unit, both pro-union and 
anti-union, and may waive important Section 7 rights in the course of 
collective bargaining, presumably in return for management conces-
sions on other fronts, this authority cannot extend to rights with re-
spect to which the union and the individual employees have essen-
tially conflicting interests."133 
While the focus of the Court in these decisions was on rights 
under the National Labor Relations Act, the conflict analysis is 
127. Id. at 35. 
128. See Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708 (1983). A waiver of a statu-
tory right will not be lightly implied. See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 u:s. 270, 283-89 
(1955). 
129. 460 U.S. at 705, quoting NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 325 (1974). 
130. Id. al 705-06. 
131. Id. at 706; NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 325 (1974). 
132. 416 U.S. at 327 (Stewart, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
133. Id. 
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equally applicable to other statutory rights. Not only is there an in-
herent tension between collective and individual interests,
134 
but also 
given the history of discrimination on the part of some unions,
135 i~ 
would be anomalous indeed to conclude that those unions could 
waive the rights of union-represented employees to a judicial forum, 
including a jury trial, for litigation of discrimination claims. While 
many unions actively support civil rights, the rule would apply 
equally to those few that not only do not support employees in their 
discrimination cases against employers, but discriminate themselves. 
It is no answer to say that employees can sue unions that discrimi-
nate, because negotiating contractual protection against discrimina-
tion will certainly not be found to be discriminatory, and the duty of 
fair representation limits the union's liability for failing to pursue 
discrimination grievances.136 
Furthermore, some discrimination cases involve conflicts be-
tween union-represented employees, such as sexual harassment alle-
gations by one employee against a co-employee."' Such cases inher-
ently contain the potential for a conflict of interest between the 
harassed employee and the union. This is not to suggest that a union 
cannot effectively represent an employee in an arbitration involving 
co-employee harassment, but only that the employee should have the 
right, where the potential for conflicting interests exists, to choose 
litigation to vindicate statutory rights."' Thus, as the Seventh Circuit 
134. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35:• 
135. See, e.g., Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 477 (1986). 
136. See infra notes 140-65 and accompanying text. 
137. The employer is liable for sexual harassment by co-employees if it knew or should have 
known about the harassment and failed to take appropriate remedial action. See, e.g., Ellison v. 
Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 881-83 (9th Cir. 1991). For cases where unions have arbitrated claims in-
volving sexual harassment, see Western Lake Superior Sanitary Dist. and Minnesota Arrowhead 
Dist. Local 96, AFSCME, 94 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 289 (1990) (Boyer, Arb.) (employer justified in 
suspending two male employees based on sexual harass1nent of female employee); McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. and UAW Local 1093, 94 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 585 (1989) (Woolf, Arb.) Gust cause 
existed to discharge employee who violated management order designed to stop sexual harass-
ment of female employee); EZ Communications, Inc., and AFTRA, 91 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1097 
(1998) (Talarico, Arb.) (female employee was justified in walking off the job based on sexual 
harassment). Notably, however, unions are frequently in the position of challenging the em-
ployer's discipline of harassers. See Western Lake, supra; McDonnell Douglas, supra. For a dis-
cussion of some of the concerns relating to arbitration of sexual harassment cases, see Tim Born-
stein, Arbitration of Sexual Harassment, in ARBITRATION 1991: THE CHANGING FACE OF 
ARBITRATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-FOURTII ANNUAL 
MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 109-20 (Gladys w. Gruenberg, ed. 1992); 
Helen R. Neuborne, Comment, in id. at 120-32. 
138. Jn addition to sexual harassment cases, employee rights may conflict in other cases as 
well, such as affirmative action issues involving conflicts between the rights of minority workers 
and more senior majority workers and Americans with Disabilities Act cases where the em-
ployee is seeking reasonable accommodation which conflicts with the rights of other employees 
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concluded in Pryner, the union, representing the majority, should 
not be permitted to waive an employee's right to a judicial forum, 
particularly where the employee is a member of a minority group 
that has been historically oppressed.139 
2. The Duty of Fair Representation Does Not Adequately Protect 
Employee Statutory Rights 
While the union is governed by the duty of fair representation, 
which provides the employee some protection from discriminatory 
treatment by the union,140 compliance with the duty of fair represen-
tation does not insure full vindication of the employee's statutory 
rights. The doctrine of fair representation does not require the un-
ion to arbitrate every case.141 The union is vested with the authority 
to determine which cases to pursue so long as the authority is exer-
cised without hostility, discrimination or arbitrariness.142 Thus, the 
union can determine not to arbitrate a discrimination claim because, 
in good faith, it doubts the merits of the claim,143 although the union 
officers making that decision may have no expertise in statutory dis-
crimination law. The union can use a lay representative, rather than 
an attorney to represent a grievant in arbitration, although the repre-
sentative may have little or no expertise in statutory discrimination 
issues. The duty of fair representation does not require the union to 
provide the employee with an attorney for the arbitration, even in 
complex cases,144 nor does it prevent the union from excluding the 
under the collective bargaining agreement. See Firefighters Local 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 
(1984) (Supreme Court overturned district court order to modify seniority system to protect from 
layoff minority workers hired as a result of affirmative action provisions in a consent decree set-
tling a Title VII claim); Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041 (7th Cir. 1996) (ADA 
does not require accommodation that violates the seniority system at the expense of other em-
ployees). 
139. 109 F.3d at 362-63. 
140. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.171, 177 (1967) ("the exclusive agent's statutory authority to 
represent all members of a designated unit includes a statutory obligation to serve the interests of 
all members without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with com-
plete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct"); Airline Pilots Ass'n v. O'Neill, 
~99. U.S. 65, 67 (1991) (reiterating the Vaca standard and holding that it applies to contract nego-
t~atlon as well as administration). Perhaps ironically, the duty of fair representation was judi-
cially developed to remedy racial discrimination on the part of unions in representing employees. 
See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); TWlstall v. Brotherhood of Lo-
comotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944). 
141. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 191. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
c· 144. See Patterson v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 959, 121 F.3d 1345, 1350 (9th 
rr. 1997); Castelli v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 752 F.2d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1985); Del Casal v. 
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employee's private attorney from the arbitration.
145 
Furthermore, the 
union's lay representatives will not be held to the same professional 
d 
146 
standar s as an attorney. 
The arbitration need not be equivalent to a judicial proceeding 
to meet the union's duty of fair representation. For example, in 
Walden v. Local 71, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the 
plaintiff employee alleged that the union breached its duty of fair 
representation by failing to consult a lawyer in preparation for the 
hearing, by failing to object to hearsay evidence introduced at the 
hea,dng, and by failing to raise a due process argument in support of 
the claim that he was discharged in violation of the collective bar-
gaining agreement.'" The Fourth Circuit, the same court that rele-
gated Austin to the grievance procedure for her Title VII and ADA 
claims, found no breach of the duty of fair representation, stating 
"[a]n arbitration is not a court of law and need not be conducted like 
one. Neither lawyers nor strict adherence to judicial rules of evi-
dence are necessary complements of industrial peace and stability-
the ultimate goals of arbitration. "
148 
Similarly, in Castelli v. Douglas Aircraft Co., the plaintiff alleged 
that the union breached its duty of fair representation by using a 
union representative who spent only one and a half hours preparing 
for the arbitration, did not call key witnesses, failed to mtroduce 
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 634 F.2d 295, 301 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 892 (1981) (the union 
may decide under what conditions it will provide counSel, but may not base such a determination 
on t):ie employee's lack of union membership); Walden v. Local 71, Int'l Bhd of Teamsters, 468 
F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1972) (union did not breach its duty by failing to consult an attorney and using 
instead a lay union representative to arbitrate the claim); Malin, supra note 92, at 87. 
145. See Garcia v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 58 F.3d 1171, 1179-80 (7th Cir. 1995) (unions have the 
right to limit the role of outside attorneys in the grievance and arbitration procedure); Castelli, 
752 F.2d at 1483 (union not required to permit employee's attorney in arbitration so long as ex-
clusion not discriminatory); Malin, supra note 92, at 87 n.45. Indeed the employer is not required 
to meet with the employee's counsel or arbitrate with the employee's counsel where the union 
has exclusive representation rights, even where the union authorized such arbitration. See Gen-
eral Drivers Local 984 v. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 23 F.3d 1039, 1043 (6th Cir. 1994); Malone v. 
United States Postal Serv., 526F.2d1099, 1106 (6th Cir.1975). 
146. See, e.g., Thomas v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 890 F.2d 909, 920 (7th Cir. 1989) (where 
the court, noting it was unreasonable to expect a union in arbitration to meet the same standards 
as an attorney in a court of law, stated "[w]e have no doubt that certain acts or omissions by a 
union official representing a grievant, while actionable if done by an attorney, would not consti-
tute a breach of the union duty of fair representation"); Curtis v. United Transp. Union, 700 F.2d 
457, 458 (8th Cir. 1983) (finding it would defeat the arbitral goals of informality and speedy 
resolution to hold a union to the standard of a reasonable attorney in a duty of fair representation 
case). 
147. 468 F.2d at 197. 
148. Id. By 1996, in Austin, the Fourth Circuit apparently lost this recognition of the goals of 
labor arbitration. 
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relevant evidence, and failed to cross examine the employer's wit-
nesses effectively.14' Like the Fourth Circnit, the Ninth Circnit found 
no breach of the duty of fair representation, noting that the conduct 
was at most negligence, or tactical mistakes which did not breach the 
duty of fair representation.150 
Even where the union employs an attorney for the grievance 
proceeding, the fair representation standard may be applied."' In 
Garcia, the plaintiff based his claim of breach of the duty of fair rep-
resentation on the attorney's conduct; specifically, failure to inter-
view or present testimony of a particular witness, failure to call the 
grievant as a witness, failure to review a videotape of evidence, and 
failure to call any witnesses or to present grievant's side of the 
story."' Applying the wide range of reasonableness standard, the 
court concluded that the lawyer's actions were strategy decisions 
which were not so irrational as to breach the duty of fair representa-
tion.153 The court stated: 
Stanton's strategy and presentation "inay not have been Garcia's 
preferred approach, and Stanton may not have been as thorough as 
he might have been. However, Garcia does not prove a disregard 
for his case sufficient to meet the standard imposed on the Union. 
Stanton pursued a rational strategy with sufficient competence and 
vigor to meet the burden of "some minimal investigation of em-
ployee grievances," and showed no "egregions disregard for union 
members' rights constituting a breach of the union's duty."154 
The Garcia court, in holding that the plaintiff established no in-
jury from any misrepresentation by the union regarding his right to 
consult an attorney, went on to state that the union's attorney was 
not required to follow any advice from plaintiff's counsel.155 The 
court recognized that the union lawyer may have chosen his strategy 
out of a concern that an alternative strategy would damage the un-
ion's credibility and indicated that the plaintiff could not have com-
149. 752 F.2d at 1482. 
150. Id. at 1483. 
151. See Garcia, 58 F.3d at 1178 (noting that a duty of fair representation case is quite differ-
ent from a malpractice action and the lawyer need only act within a wide range of reasonable-
~es~)_. See also Peterson v. Kennedy, 771F.2d1244, 1256 (9th Cir. 1985) (union attorney has no 
liab1hty to individual grievants for malpractice independent of the duty of fair representation) . 
. 152. Garcia, 58 F.3d at 1178. Garcia also claimed that the union prevented Garcia from hiring 
his own attorney. Id. 
~5.3. Id. at 1177-79. Jn Patterson, the court similarly refused to question a union's strategy 
dec1s1on in arbitration so long as it was supported by a reasoned explanation. 121 F.3d at 1349-
50. 
154. Garcia, 58 F.3d at 1179 (citations omitted). 
155. Id. at 1180. 
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pelled a different choice."' 
Moore v. Duke Power Co.,"' a recent North Carolina case, dem-
onstrates the limits of the duty of fair representation in insuring that 
employees' statutory nondiscrimination rights are protected under 
the Austin rule. The plaintiff, Moore, was terminated by the em-
ployer, allegedly because of his disability."' He filed a grievance un-
der the collective bargaining agreement and a complaint of disability 
discrimination with the Office of Contract Federal Compliance Pro-
grams. His lawsuit alleging violations of the ADA and state law was 
stayed pending arbitration. The union arbitrated his termination 
grievance but refused to raise the disability discrimination claims in 
the arbitration, although it had allegedly promised to do so. The 
union al~o prevented the plaintiff's attorney from participating in the 
arbitration. Jhe arbitrator found the plaintiff had been discharged 
for just cause. 
Based on Austin, the court granted summary judgment for the 
employer, concluding that the plaintiff arbitrated his claim and lost 
and that the union's failure to raise the disability discrimination ar-
gument did not violate the duty of fair representation. The court de-
termined that 'a reference in the preamble of the collective bargain-
ing agreement to discrimination on the basis of handicap indicated 
that the agreement was intended to cover such claims. Thus Moore 
was bound to arbitrate. He lost and was bound by the result, absent 
evidence that the union's conduct was "'grossly deficient' or in reck-
less disregard of the member's rights. "159 The court concluded: 
"Taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the evidence es-
tablishes that the Union, at arbitration, either forgot to raise plain-
tiff's concerns about disability discrimination or instead made a stra-
tegic decision not to pursue that aspect of plaintiff's grievance 
regarding his termination. At best, such evidence establishes that the 
Union was negligent in its representation of plaintiff or merely made 
a strategic error."160 Accordingly, the Austin rule precluded Moore's 
156. Id. at 1180-81. "A private attorney would have had no power to force Stanton to follow 
a strategy that Stanton found detrimental to the union." Id. at 1181. 
157. 971 F. Supp. 978 (W.D.N.C.1997). 
158. Id. at 979. All facts are taken from the court's opinion. The plaintiff also complained of 
discrimination in various acts which preceded his termination, including a demotion, several 
transfer denials, and a suspension. Id. at 980. 
159. Id. at 982, citing Ash v. United Parcel Serv., 800 F.2d 409, 411 (4th Cir.1986). 
160. Id. at 985. Plaintiff's claim relating to his suspension was dismissed because the union 
accepted the employer's contention, which "may have been wrong," that the grievance was un-
timely. Id. at 983. The court determined that the union's failure to investigate the employer's 
claim was not grossly deficient conduct. Id. -' 
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disability discrimination claim from hearing in any forum because of 
his inability to meet the demanding standard required to prove that 
the union breached its duty of fair representation. 
These cases demonstrate that the duty of fair representation 
does not adequately protect the employees' rights under the dis-
crimination statutes. The employee does not have the right to legal 
representation, has no control over strategy decisions in arbitration, 
may be represented by an individual with little or no knowledge of 
statutory discrimination law, may have an arbitrator (selected by the 
union and the company without her input) with little or no knowl-
edge of discrimination law,161 and may have no right to any discov-
ery."' Indeed, the employee's claim may never be heard in any fo-
rum if the union decides not to arbitrate or arbitrates but does not 
raise the discrimination claim. Furthermore, the typical local union 
161. The problem of arbitral familiarity with discrimination law may apply equally to individ-
ual arbitration, but at least in that forum, the individual Participates in selecting the arbitrator 
and has the opportunity to select a knowledgeable arbitrator, although she may lack the informa-
tion necessary to make such participation effective. See infra note 243. A 1975 survey of arbitra-
tors indicated that only half kept current on Title VII issues and only 14o/o believed that they 
could define accurately basic employment discrintination concepts. Harry Edwards, Arbitration 
of En1ploy1nent Discrimination Cases: An Empirical Study, in PROCEEDINGS OF TiiE TwENTY~ 
EIGHTH NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 59 (1976). Nevertheless, 72o/o concluded that 
they were competent to decide legal issues in employment discrimination cases. Id. The Due 
Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes arising out of the Employ-
ment Relationship recognized that "the existing cadre of labor and employment mediators and 
arbitrators, some lawyers, some not, although skilled in conducting hearings and familiar with the 
employ1nent milieu is unlikely, without special training, to consistently possess knowledge of the 
statutory environment in which these disputes arise,, .. " See Prototype Agreement on Job Bias 
Dispute Resolution, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 91 at E-11(May11, 1995) [hereinafter Prototype 
Agreen1ent]. The Due Process Protocol has been endorsed by the National Academy of Arbitra-
tors Board of Governors and by union and management representatives of the Employment and 
Labor Law Section of the American Bar Association. Academy Board Endorses ADR Task 
F_orce Protocol, 149 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) at 161 (June 5, 1995). In recommending more exten-
sive use of voluntary arbitration to resolve employment disputes, the Dunlop Commission en-
c~uraged the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to establish a training program on 
discrimination law for arbitrators and to adopt standard training requirements for arbitrators 
marketing their services for resolving discrimination disputes. See REPORT AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS OF TIIE COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, 
reprinted in Daily Lab, Rep. (BNA) No. 6 at d55(January10, 1995). 
162. FRANK ELKO URI & EDNA ASPER ELKO URI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 304-310 (4th 
ed. 1985). The absence of discovery is not unique to collectively bargained arbitration proce-
:, _dur~s. The Gilmer Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that limited discovery rendered arbi-
Jration of statutory claims inappropriate, noting that by agreeing to arbitrate, the plaintiff traded 
,t,he more extensive judicial procedures for a simpler, more expeditious proceeding. 500 U.S. at 
\31.. ~e Court left open the possibility, however, that discovery might be so limited as to deny a 
:plamtiff a fair opportunity to present her claims. Id. Some "discovery" is available in the griev-
ce. ~rocedure using the NLRA right to request and receive information relevant to contract 
~stration. See NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967). The right belongs to the 
!lton rather than the employee, however, and the union is accountable to the employee only 
ough the duty of fair representation. See Malin, supra note 92, at 87. 
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has limited financial resources for pursuing complex discrimination 
cases which may require extensive research in order to gather evi-
dence of discrimination. 
The limitations on the union's accountability to employees in 
handling grievances are appropriate where the contractual grievance 
procedure serves the purpose of developing private law governing 
the workplace."' As the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized, 
grievance arbitration is a part of the collective bargaining process, 
not a substitute for litigation.164 Using arbitration, the parties refine 
and flesh out their agreement resolving issues left open by the gen-
eral language of the agreement.'" Thus, union control over the pro-
cedure, with limited recourse by the employees, insures that the sys-
tem of collective bargaining can operate as Congress intended, 
leading to industrial peace rather than warfare. A determination 
that the union's agreement to the arbitration procedure not only 
waives the right to strike and provides a method for peacefully de-
termining private law, but also waives the employees' statutory right 
to litigate and establishes a forum for determining public law, does 
not further the goal of industrial peace. In addition, it is inconsistent 
with the purposes underlying the discrimination statutes. 
3. Finding A Waiver Based on A Collective Bargaining Agreement 
Penalizes Employees for Exercising Their Statutory Right to Bargain 
Collectively and Does Not Meet the Stringent Standard Required for 
Such a Waiver 
An employee who chooses a collective bargaining representative 
is on notice that the representative will bargain for the employee's 
terms and conditions of employment. Similarly, an employee who 
signs an individual agreement with his employer to arbitrate statu-
163. Malin, supra note 92, at 87. 
164. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United 
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise 
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). Indeed, the grievance and arbitration procedure is the 
quid pro quo for the agreement not to strike. The strength of this rationale is demonstrated by 
the Court's decision in Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 105-06 (1962), 
where the Court held that the very existence of a grievance and arbitration procedure in an 
agreement implied a promise by the union not to strike during the term of the contract. For addi-
tional discussion of differences between labor arbitration and arbitration of statutory disputes, 
see Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitration of Public-Law Dispute~·, 
1995 U. ILL. L, REV. 635; G. Richard Shell, ERISA and Other Federal Employment Statutes: 
When is Commercial Arbitration an "Adequate Substitute" for the Courts?, 68 TEX. L. REV. 509, 
511-15 (1990). 
165. St. Antoine, supra note 10, at 1140, 1161. 
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tory claims is on notice that arbitration will be the forum for resolu-
tion of employment-related statutory disputes.166 In contrast, the 
employee whose union negotiates a collective bargaining agreement 
containing a prohibition on discrimination and a standard grievance 
and arbitration provision is extremely unlikely to be aware, much 
less agree, that the union has negotiated away his right to litigate a 
statutory discrimination claim. Indeed, the union may be unaware 
that it is doing so.167 
The impact of the determination of waiver is analogous to the 
impact of the state law provisions found preempted by the Supreme 
Court in Livadas v. Bradshaw."' In Livadas, the Court held that the 
NLRA preempted the California statutory provision which denied 
enforcement of state wage claims filed by employees covered by col-
lective bargaining agreements with arbitration provisions."' Ac-
cording to the Court, the state law impermissibly burdened employ-
ees who chose to exercise their federal right to bargain collectively 
166. Gilme1~ 500 U.S. at 32-3. Furthermore, the employee retains the right to prove that the 
waiver of a judicial forum was not knowing. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1304-05 
{9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 812 (1995). For criticism of mandatory arbitration of statu-
tory clahns in the nonunion context, see NEIU's Position on Mandatory Arbitration of Eniploy-
ment Disputes, l EMPLOYEE RTS & EMPWYMENT POLICY J. 263 (1997); EEOC Policy Statement 
on Mandatory Arbitration, 1997 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 133 at d30 (July 11, 1997); Michele 
L. Giovagnoli, To Be or Not to Be? Recent Resistance to Mandatory Arbitration Agreements in the 
Employnient Arena, 64 UMKC L. REV. 547 (1996); Grodin, supra note 121; David S. Schwartz, 
Enforcing S1nall Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in An Age 
of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WISC. L. REV. 33; Stone, supra note 121; Brian K. Van Engen, 
Post-Gilnier Developments in Mandatory Arbitration: The Expansion of Mandatory Arbitration 
for Statutory Claims and the Congressional Effort to Reverse the Trend, 21 J. CORP. L. 391 (1996); 
John L. Zalusky, A Union View of Nonrepresented Employees' Grievance Systems, in LABOR 
ARBITRATION UNDER FIRE 182 (James L. Stern & Joyce M. Najita, eds. 1997). 
167. Certainly it is unlikely that the union consciously intended to bargain for such a waiver 
for the union has no reason to seek such a waiver and many reasons not to do so, not the least of 
Which is subjecting itself to additional fair representation claims. See infra notes 191-211 and ac-
companying text. 
168. 512 U.S. 107 (1994). 
;:->: 169. Id. at 109. Notably, the court in Livadas, reaffirmed the distinction between Gilmer and 
Gardner-Denver while emphasizing their "basic consistency": 
In ~ol?ing that an agreement to arbitrate an Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
claim is enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act, Gilmer emphasized its basic 
consistency with our unanimous decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 
(19'.4), permitting a discharged employee to bring a Title VII claim, notwithstanding his 
h~v~ng ~lready grieved the dismissal under a collective-bargaining agreement. Gilmer 
distmgu1shed Gardner-Denver as relying, inter alia, on: the "distinctly separate nature of 
···contractual and statutory rights" (even when both were "violated as a result of the 
same factual occurrence"), 415 U.S. at 50; the fact that a labor "arbitrator has authority 
to res~lve only questions of contractual rights." Id., at 53-54; and the concern that in 
coll~chve-bargaining arbitration, "the interests of the individual employee may be sub-
ordinated to the collective interests of all employees in the bargaining unit." Id. at 58 
n.19. 
127 n.21. 
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and to negotiate an arbitration provision by denying them the pro-
tection of a state statnte.170 The Court not only concluded that the 
state law was preempted, but found that Livadas was entitled to pur-
sue redress under Section 1983 because of the state statute's interfer-
ence with her statutory rights to bargain collectively and to agree to 
an arbitration clause.171 Similarly, under the rule of the Austin Court, 
the employee is penalized by losing her judicial forum because she is 
represented by a union which has negotiated an arbitration provi-
sion. Unlike Austin, however, in Livadas there was no claim that the 
union waived the employee's statutory right nor was there an indica-
tion that the parties considered the statutory claim to be covered by 
the arbitration provision, so the Court did not have to consider 
whether such a waiver would be effective.172 Nevertheless, the Court 
stated that such a waiver would have to "be clear and unmistakable 
for a court even to consider whether it could be given effect."
173 
The National Labor Relations Board, with approval of the Su-
preme Court, has applied this stringent standard for waiver of Na-
tional Labor Relations Act rights."' And as the Livadas Court 
noted, the standard is appropriate for union waivers of other statu-
tory rights as well.175 Negotiation of a contractual antidiscrimination 
provision, even one which incorporates discrimination statutes, and 
an arbitration procedure for contract enforcement cannot meet this 
stringent waiver standard. Therefore, even if a union waiver of 
statutory rights is permissib.le, none should be found based solely on 
the negotiation of contractual protection of statutory rights. 
Under NLRA precedent, neither general contractual provisions 
nor bargaining history that does not evidence a full discussion, con-
scious exploration and conscious yielding of position can waive a 
statutory right."' Several examples illustrate the Supreme Court's 
170. Id. at 123. The state attempted to justify its statutory inaction on the theory that Section 
301 preempts state law claims which depend on interpretation of the collective bargaining 
agreement. See Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988). As the Suprcn1e 
Court noted, however, the state's position was not limited to such circumstances and, indeed, Li-
vadas' claim did not depend on interpretation of the agreement. 512 U.S. at 124. 
171. Id. at 132. 
172. Id. at 125. 
173. Id. (citation omitted). 
174. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693 (1983); Johnson-Bateman Co., 295 
N.L.R.B.180 (1989). See infra notes 176-79 and accompanying text. 
175. Livadas, 512 U.S. at 125. In addition to Metropolitan Edison, the Court cited its earlier 
decision in Lingle, 486 U.S. at 410 n.9, where it stated that union waiver of an employee's slale 
statutory right would have to be clear and unmistakable before the Court would conclude that 
such a waiver was intended. 
176. Johnson-Bateman, Co., 295 N.L.R.B. at 184-85. 
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reluctance to infer a waiver. In Metropolitan Edison, two arbitrators 
had interpreted the contractual no strike clause to permit disparately 
severe punishment of union officials for their participation in unlaw-
ful strikes because of their duty to uphold the contract.
177 
Despite 
the two decisions, the union failed to seek modification of the con-
tractual no strike clause. When the employer subsequently disci-
plined union officials more harshly for violating the no strike clause, 
the union then filed unfair labor practice charges alleging that the 
employer's action constituted unlawful discrimination under the 
NLRA. The employer argued that the union had waived the offi-
cials' statutory right by acquiescing in the prior arbitrators' interpre-
tations of the no strike clause. The Court disagreed, looking for 
much more to find a waiver-either an arbitration decision stating 
that the contract clearly and unmistakably imposed an express duty 
on union officials to end unlawful strikes or a clear and consistent 
pattern of arbitration decisions and circumstances under which it 
could be said that the parties incorporated those decisions into the 
collective bargaining agreement."' Similarly, in Mastro Plastics, the 
Court concluded that contract language agreeing to refrain from any 
strike or work stoppage during the term of the agreement did not 
waive the right to strike over unfair labor practices during the term 
of the agreement.179 
This stringent standard for waivers insures that employee rights 
are not waived without express intent to do so. Like the duty of fair 
representation, this standard protects employees. No such stringent 
standard was applied by the courts finding waivers of the right to liti-
gate a statutory discrimination claim before a jury. Even the clear 
intent to incorporate such statutory claims in the contract does not 
establish an intent to waive litigation of them, particularly in light of 
the existing precedent of Gardner-Denver. And certainly the union's 
negotiation of a broad arbitration provision without inclusion of con-
tractual language regarding statutory discrimination law cannot es-
tablish an intent to waive litigation of statutory claims. 
; The Supreme Court has required that waiver of statutory rights 
>by individuals be knowing and voluntary.1' 0 The Austin Court ap-
'· parently concluded that such a waiver existed because the agreement 
was voluntary, finding her to be a party to the agreement solely by 
460 U.S. at 709. All facts are taken from the Court's decision. 
Id. 
350 U.S. at 281. 
Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 52 n.15. 
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virtue of her membership in the bargaining unit.
1
" The Court of-
fered no support for this conclusion and it is contrary to the princi-
ples of labor and employment law.rn' The employee's rights under 
the agreement can be contractually limited, particularly the right to 
arbitrate grievances. For example, where the individual employee 
does not have a contractual right to invoke arbitration, the employee 
may not compel arbitration.183 The same is true where the court con-
cludes that the employee is attempting to arbitrate a broad policy is-
sue that directly concerns only the union.184 Furthermore, the 
agreement is negotiated by the union, and may or may not be ratified 
by the employees.185 Even where ratification is required, it occurs by 
majority vote. An individual employee opposed to a particular pro-
vision is bound by it if the contract is ratified despite her opposition. 
Accordingly, even if the employee's waiver of a judicial forum was 
knowing, it cannot be voluntary since a contract waiving such rights 
can be negotiated and approved despite her opposition. Where col-
lective rights are involved, this scheme furthers the statutory goals of 
collective bargaining and labor peace, but it may frustrate the goal of 
protecting employees from discrimination. 
4. Compelling Arbitration of Statutory Claims Under a Collective 
Bargaining Agreement Does Not Merely Substitute A Different 
Forum for Hearing the Discrimination Claim 
In holding that Gilmer was required to arbitrate his statutory 
ADEA claim, the Supreme' Court, quoting Mitsubishi, stated '"[b]y 
agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the 
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their 
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.'" 186 Given the 
differences between labor arbitration and commercial arbitration, 
however, this representation simply does not hold true in labor arbi-
181. Austin, 78 F.3d at 885-86. 
182. See H. David Kelly, Jr., An Argument for Retaining the Well Established Distinction Be-
tween Contractual and Statutory Claims in Labor Arbitration, 75 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1, 65 
(1997). 
183. See Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists Lodge 355, 313 F.2d 179 (2d 
CiI. 1962). 
184. See Brown v. Sterling Aluminum Products Corp., 365 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. de-
nied, 386 U.S. 957 (1967) (employer relocation is a broad policy issue and the employee cannot 
compel arbitration absent the union). 
185. Ratification is not required by law. See ".MARTIN H. MALIN, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 
WITHINTiiE UNION 60, 378 (1988). 
186. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26, quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Ply1nouth, 
Inc .• 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985). 
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tration. As noted, labor arbitration is not a substitute for litigation. 
Instead, it is a substitute for the strike. It is designed to be a con-
tinuation of the collective bargaining process, not to litigate individ-
ual statutory claims. Accordingly, it has characteristics that render it 
inappropriate for that purpose. 
Unlike the arbitration agreement in Gilmer, the individual cov-
ered by a collectively bargained arbitration provision is relegated to 
a forum in which she does not control her claim. She cannot decide 
whether or not to arbitrate and may be lawfully precluded from arb.i-
trating her claim. She cannot participate in choosing the arbitrator."' 
If the claim is arbitrated, she cannot choose her own representative 
and the union-designated representative may have no expertise in 
statutory claims. She cannot make strategy decisions or determine 
which arguments to raise or which witnesses to call in support of her 
claim. While such limitations are appropriate to effectuate the na-
tional labor policy of collective representation, they render labor ar-
bitration an ineffective substitute for litig11tion of individual claims. 
These differences are not the challenges to the adequacy of arbitra-
tion generally rejected by the Gilmer court,188 but differences relevant 
to labor arbitration in particular. Moreover, they are differences 
which may adversely affect the employee's statutory right to be free 
from discrimination. Indeed, they may prevent the employee's dis-
crimination claim from receiving any hearing, thus insuring that she 
will receive no remedy for any discrimination."' 
B. The Fourth Circuit's Decision Imposes a Duty of Fair 
Representation on the Union for Statutory Claims 
The Fourth Circuit's decisions in Austin and Wright expand the 
of fair representation beyond its intended application. Unions 
''L:.: .. 187 · Of course, the union could involve the employee in decision-making but it is not re-
8Urred to do so and may be concerned about setting such a precedent as employees with non-
··ftJ_atutory claims may then demand more extensive involvement in the process. 
188. 500 U.S. at 30-33. 
189 . . see, e.g., Moore v. Duke Power Co., 971 F. Supp. 978 (W.D.N.C. 1997). Section 301 
:e.emption also deprives unionized employees of certain causes of action under state law and 
been criticized for that reason. See Bales, supra note 121, at 718; l(atherine Van Wezel 
e, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralisni: The Tension Between Individual Employment Rights 
t~e New Deal Collective Bargaining Systen1, 59 U. OII. L. REV. 575, 605-20 (1992). Despite 
Cl.Sm of the pree1nption doctrine, it at least serves the purpose of insuring uniform interpreta-
-~ collective bargaining agree1nents, long held to be an important goal of national labor pol-
ocal 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). The Austin rule furthers no 
goal. 
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chosen by a majority of employees under the NLRA procedures,"0 
have both the right to exclusive representation and the correspond-
ing duty of fair representation."' Unions have years of experience in 
negotiating collective bargaining agreements, administering con-
tracts, including arbitration of contractual claims, and complying with 
the duty of fair representation. Relegation of statutory claims to the 
contractual arbitration procedure arguably expands the right of ex-
clusive representation and almost certainly expands the duty of fair 
representation to include statutory claims. 
Because the duty of fair representation arises out of the right of 
exclusive representation,192 it has been confined to matters on which 
the union exclusively represents the employee.193 Although unions 
have often negotiated contractual provisions prohibiting discrimina-
tion,"' the union does not exclusively represent the employee with 
respect to statutory employment discrimination claims. The em-
ployee can file and pursue such a claim even if the union opposes the 
filing. The employee can settle the claim with the employer without 
union input or approval.1" By way of contrast, a union-represented 
employee cannot negotiate his or her own wage provisions or con-
tractual grievance procedure.196 Since statutory employment dis-
crimination claims are not within the zone of exclusive representa-
tion, the union has no duty to file such a claim on behalf of the 
employee or to represent the employee making such a claim.
197 
The 
union does have a duty to represent the employee with respect to 
wages and to negotiate' wage provisions without discrimination or 
bad faith, however. 
190. See 29U.S.C.§159 (1994). 
191. Steele, 323 U.S. at 204. 
192. Id.; see also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.171 (1967). 
193. See infra note 217 and accompanying text. 
194. Under the NLRA, prohibitions on employment discrimination are conditions of em-
ployment and therefore mandatory subjects of bargaining. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 901 
(Patrick Hardin, ed., 3d ed. 1992). When a subject is mandatory, neither party may refuse to 
bargain about the subject and either party may insist to impasse on inclusion of a provision re-
lating to the subject in the collective bargaining agreement and take economic action to co1npel 
such inclusion. See NLRB v. Wooster Div., Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). 
195. An arbitration award which conflicts with a settlement of a discrimination claim may be 
enforced against the employer, however, where the union was not involved in the settlement. See 
W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757 (1983). 
196. Indeed the employer who negotiates individually with an employee represented by a 
union violates Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act. See Medo Photo Supply 
Corp. v. NLRB, 321U.S.678 (1944); Allied-Signal, Inc., 307 N.L.R.B. 752 (1992). 
197. MALIN, supra note 185, at 414 ("No court has suggested that a union has an affirmative 
duty to litigate on behalf of the employees it represents to redress discrimination."). 
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In holding that statutory claims must be arbitrated, courts are 
requiring the union to represent the employee with respect to the 
statutory claim. Employees who want to litigate apparently are rele-
gated to suing the union for breach of the duty of fair representation. 
Yet as demonstrated above, the requirements of the duty do not 
hold the union to the standard of an attorney handling a statutory 
claim for an individual in any forum. If this is unsatisfactory from 
the point of view of the employee, it also creates significant difficul-
ties for the union. 
While the courts have been deferential to union decisions in ar-
bitration of contractual claims because of the union's representation 
of collective interests, it is not clear that the same deference will be 
applied when the claim is statutory."' Must the union train its repre-
sentatives in employment discrimination law? Must it use lawyers in 
discrimination cases? Must the union educate its representatives 
about arbitrator selection for statutory cases?"' Does the union's 
decision not to arbitrate bind the employee? If the arbitrator rules 
against the union, finding no discrimination, must the union request 
review of the decision in court? Alternatively, if the arbitrator rules 
for the union and the employer does not comply with the decision, 
does the duty of fair representation require the union to seek en-
forcement, regardless of its financial resources? 
Unions must allocate scarce resources, determining which claims 
to arbitrate not only on the basis of merit, but taking into account 
the limited resources of the union.200 Litigation of a statutory dis-
crimination claim can be extremely expensive even if that litigation 
198. Some commentators have argued for more extensive judicial review of arbitral decisions 
on statutory issues. See, e.g., Estreichcr, supra note 126, at 796; Martin H. Malin & Robert F. 
~adenson, Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential Perspective on Labor and Employment Arbitra-
tion from the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilme1~ 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1187 (1993); Ronald Turner, 
Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims with Special Reference to the 
Three A's-Access, Adjudication, and Acceptability, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 231, 293 (1996). 
199. See Stephen L. Hayford, The Coming Third Era of Labor Arbitration, 48 ARB. J, 8 
(1993) (Advocates in arbitration cases involving statutory issues must select arbitrators with the 
necessary expertise in the substantive law). 
200. An arbitrator's charge for a single arbitration is, on average, $2222.38. LAURA J. 
'?OOPER & DENNIS R. NOLAN, LABOR ARBITRATION: A COURSEBOOK 463 (1996) (1992 statis-
~lCS from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service). If a lawyer is used, costs increase sub-
,,stantially. Id. at 464. Not only must the union pay the attorney's fees, but briefs and transcripts 
-~re used more frequently when lawyers are involved in the arbitration, adding to the cost. Id. 
urthermore arbitrating a statutory claim could be even more expensive. See infra notes 206-07 
':_~lld accompanying text. For further information about arbitrator fees in statutory disputes, see 
ole v. Burns Int'l Security Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1480-81 and n.8 ($700 per day is average arbi-
ator's fee according to the American Arbitration Association, but some arbitrators charge 
00-$600 per hour and the typical employment case requires 15-40 hours of arbitrator time). 
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takes place in the arbitral forum.201 For example, to litigate a dis-
crimination case effectively, expert witnesses may be required."' So-
phisticated statistical analysis may be necessary as well.
203 
Statisti-
cians and other expert witnesses can add significant expense to 
arbitration.204 Additionally, discrimination claims often involve so-
phisticated inquiries into employer motive.
205 
Absent specialized 
training, the traditional labor arbitrator may lack the expertise nec-
essary to deal with such issues.206 The same skepticism applies to the 
union officials who must make determinations regarding the merits 
of discrimination claims in deciding whether to arbitrate them, and 
then arbitrate those with merit. Obtaining the necessary expertise 
would impose a cost beyond the resources of most unions,
207 
yet the 
alternative under the Fourth Circuit's rule is either ineffective litiga-
tion or no litigation of most statutory claims. 
If an employee's only chance to litigate a discrimination claim is 
through a duty of fair representation suit, such suits are likely to in-
crease, particularly if unions decline to arbitrate.
208 
If arbitration is 
201. See Robert J. Rabin, The Role of Unions in the Rights-Based Workplace, 25 U.S.F.L. 
REV. 169, 203 (1991) (noting that unions do not become actively involved in protecting public 
rights outside of collective bargaining because they lack the resources, particularly when legal 
representation is involved.) 
202. See Price, Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988). 
203. See, e.g., Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986); Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 
(1982); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977). For discussion of the use of 
statistical evidence in employment dAscrimination cases, see 2 BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL 
GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1687~1737 (3d ed. 1996); MICHAEL J. 
ZIM:MER, ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 278-98, 477-87 
(4th ed.1997). 
204. See, e.g., Gray v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 758 F. Supp. 673, 674 (D. Kan. 1991), rev'd, 971 
F.2d 591 (10th Cir. 1992) (Plaintiff in ADEA case sought $68,009.25 in expert witness fees). 
205. See Michael J, Zimmer, The Emerging Uniform Structure of Disparate Treatment Dis-
crimination Litigation, 30 GA. L. REV. 563, 563, 564 (1996) (noting both that "the essence of 
most cases ... turns on the issue of whether the employer acted with an intent to discriminate" 
and that "the concept of individual disparate treatment discrimination ... is difficult and compli-
cated.") Zimmer's article demonstrates the complexity of the proof schemes under disparate 
treatment discrimination law. 
206. See supra note 161. 
207. See infra notes 233-35 and accompanying text regarding the cost of legal representation 
and supra note 204 regarding the cost of experts. The average labor arbitrator's charge is 
$2222.38, see note 200 supra. Most local unions, whose only income is from employee dues, can 
afford to arbitrate only a few cases per year and many do not use attorneys because of the cost of 
legal representation. In right to work states, where employees are not required to pay the cost of 
representation, union resources are even more limited. Notably, three of the five states in the 
Fourth Circuit are right to work states. See ARCHIBALD COX, ET AL., CASES ON LABOR LAW 
1090 (12th ed. 1996) (North Carolina, South Carolina and Virginia). 
208. If the employee files an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations 
Board alleging breach of the duty of fair representation based on a union's refusal to arbitrate a 
statutory claim, the N.L.R.B., in determining whether the duty was breached, would have to de-
,_ 
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costly, a duty of fair representation case is more so.
20
' Moreover, liti-
gation of statutory claims in grievance arbitration may further for-
malize arbitration, a concern that has already surfaced due to the in-
creasing use of lawyers."0 Ironically, a decision supporting and 
encouraging arbitration may lead to elimination of some of the ad-
vantages of arbitration, such as speed and informality. Given the dif-
ficulties created for unions and employees by the Fourth Circuit rule, 
the question arises whether there exist alternatives for unions desir-
ing to protect the statutory rights of employees. The next section 
considers such alternatives. 
IV. UNION PROTECTION OF EMPLOYEE RIGIITS 
Thus far this article has argued that arbitration under collective 
bargaining agreements differs substantially from arbitration under 
individual agreements and that the Supreme Court should reaffirm 
that distinction, which it recognized in earlier cases. It might be ar-
gued, however, that despite the rule ofthe Fourth Circuit, unions can 
protect employee statutory rights. A review of the alternatives avail-
able to unions seeking to preserve the statutory rights of employees 
to be free from discrimination,211 however, demonstrates that none 
satisfactorily protects employee rights without sacrificing important 
collective goals or risking duty of fair representation claims. Because 
duty of fair representation claims are costly to the union, they ulti-
mately injure employees by limiting the union's effectiveness in rep, 
resenting the employees in the bargaining unit. 
cide whether the employee's claim was meritorious. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 337, 307 N.L.R.B. 
437 (1992) (union lawfully refused to arbitrate employee's grievance where merits of grievance ~ere, at most, debatable). Thus, as part of the resolution of the unfair labor practice charge, an tne~perienced and unauthorized agency would become enmeshed in deciding whether discrimi-
nation statutes other than the National Labor Relations Act have arguably been violated. 
209. A duty of fair representation case will certainly require attorneys' fees and unless the 
-,:case_ is quickly dismissed, discovery costs as well. COOPER & NOLAN, supra note 200, at 464 
(arbitration is cheaper than litigation). 
-:;--:-: 210. See, e.g., Reginald Alleyne, Delawyerizing Labor Arbitration, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 93, 95, ~07 (1989); Creeping Legalism in Labor Arbitration: An Editorial, 13 ARB. J.129 (1958). <-~, . 211. This is a matter of concern to unions in the Fourth Circuit presently and in the First, 
;,:Fifth, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits where no definitive ruling has been issued by the 
__ -so~rt of Appeals. Based on Austin, district courts in the Fourth Circuit continue to dismiss ~_auns based on collectively-bargained arbitration provisions. See, e.g., Brown v. ABF Freight 
_,)'Stem, I~~-, 1998WL105641 (E.D. Va. Feb. 17, 1998) (where contract refers to discriminatory 
, __ C2ts proh1b1ted by law, plaintiff's ADA claim is dismissed for failure to arbitrate). 
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A. Preserving Litigation Rights Using Contractual Language 
Unions might protect employee litigation rights by eliminating 
contractual nondiscrimination provisions and expressly limiting the 
grievance procedure to contractual disputes. With such contractual 
provisions, there would be no arbitrable grievance and the employee 
would be relegated to judicial action.212 There are several problems 
with this approach, however. First, while many grievance and arbi-
tration provisions are limited to contractual disputes, others are 
broader.213 Narrowing the grievance and arbitration procedure in 
those contracts would prevent the union from both grieving and arbi-
trating many disputes other than statutory claims. Accordingly, em-
ployees would lose substantial rights unrelated to statutory discrimi-
nation. 
To eliminate this problem, the union could seek to exclude 
statutory claims from arbitration expressly, while retaining the broad 
arbitration language for other noncontractual issues. There is little 
incentive for an employer to agree to such a proposal, however. Ar-
bitration of statutory claims is an alternative to litigation, one which 
may well benefit the employer as evidenced by the increasing use of 
arbitration agreements in the nonunion sector.214 An employer is 
unlikely to give up the protection of an agreement to arbitrate statu-
tory claims while allowing the union to retain the right to arbitrate 
other noncontractual claims. To obtain such a contractual change 
the employer might insist t~at the union make economic concessions, 
thereby causing the employees to sacrifice other benefits.215 
212. Of course, the employee would first have to exhaust administrative remedies. See 29 
U.S.C. § 626(d) (1994) (charge must be filed with EEOC before filing judicial action under 
ADEA); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l), (f)(l) (1994) (under Title VII charge must be filed with the 
EEOC, which will issue notice of right to sue, and the individual must file suit within 90 days of 
receipt of such notice); 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (1994) (adopting Title VII procedures for enforcement 
of ADA). 
213. See, e.g., Wright, 1997 WL 422869 at *2. 
214. A survey by the General Accounting Office indicated that 19o/o of the private employers 
responding used arbitration to resolve workplace disputes. U.S. GEN. Acer. OFF., ALTER-
NATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: EMPLOYERS' EXPERIENCES WilH ADR IN THE WORKPLACE, 
GAO/GGD-97-157 (1997). Private employers adopted alternative dispute resolution to reduce 
the costs-in time, money and good employment relationships - associated with "employment-
related lawsuits and discrimination complaints." Id. at 8. The number of cases in which employers 
have sought dismissal of statutory discrimination claims based on collectively bargained griev-
ance and arbitration procedures also indicates the importance of such provisions to employers. 
For further discussion of the reasons employers may prefer arbitration of discrimination claims, 
see R. Theodore Clark, Jr., A Management View of Nonunion Employee Arbitration Procedures, 
in LABOR ARBITRATION UNDER FlRE, supra note 166, at 162. 
215. Of course, collective bargaining is about exchanging benefits and requires tradeoffs by 
both parties, but in this case the employees are giving up economic benefits to preserve rights 
,, 
'iy 
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Removal of contractual nondiscrimination provisions, necessary 
to insure retention of the litigation alternative, takes away an option 
for the union and the employees."' The union would be unable to 
grieve and arbitrate discrimination claims against the employer.217 
Some employees may prefer to arbitrate discrimination claims, an 
option that would be lost by eliminating language requiring or per-
mitting arbitration of statutory claims.21' Accordingly, the union may 
which Congress gave them by statute. 
216. Arbitration is a matter of agreement. If there is no agreement to arbitrate a particular 
claim, arbitration cannot be compelled. AT&T Technologies v. Communications Workers, 475 
U.S. 643, 648-49 (1986). If arbitration of contractual discrimination claims remains an option, the 
inability to arbitrate a statutory claim may be irrelevant, however. The employee could arbitrate 
the contractual claim (assuming the union decided to arbitrate) and if the employee lost, litigate 
the statulory claim based on common facts. See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 53-54 (arbitrator 
has authority to resolve only questions of contractual rights even where the contractual rights are 
similar to statutory nondiscdmination rights). Elimination of language referring to the statute 
might limit the union's ability to argue that statutory standards should be applied in arbitration of 
contractual discrimination issues also. There is substantial debate in the arbitral community · 
about the use of external law in arbitration and an argllment could be made that a contractual 
change eli1ninating statutory language evidenced an intent to limit the use of statutory standards 
by the arbitrator. See COOPER & NOLAN, supra note 200, at 61-76 and authorities cited therein. 
217. It is not at all uncommon for unions to arbitrate discrimination claims. See, e.g., Chicago 
Transit Auth. and Amalgatnated Transit Union Local 305, 95 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 753 (1990) 
(Goldstein, Arb.); P.D.I. Inc, and International Ass'n of Machinists Lodge 276, 91 Lab. Arb. 
(BNA) 21 (1988) (Dworkin, Arb.). Nor is it unusual for the union to grieve employer action on · 
several bases, one of which is discrimination. See, e.g., ITI Federal Servs. Corp. and International 
Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 959, 105 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 289 (1995) (Landau, Arb.) (union chal-
lenged grievant's layoff as violative of the agreement's nondiscdmination clause and the seniodty 
·clause). Even in the absence of a contractual prohibition on discrimination, a union could still 
challenge terminations or other discipline as discriminatory based on a contractual requirement 
;of just cause for discipline or discharge. See, e.g., Thrifty Cos. and United Food & Commercial 
·:·Workers Union, Local 839, 103 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 317 (1994) (Staudohar, Arb.) (union chal-
}enged discharge of diabetic employee as without just cause based on the lack of an absenteeism 
·policy and inconsistent treatment of illness-related absences, although arbitrator relied on ADA 
t!_) support his decision); Jefferson-Smurfit Corp. and Graphic Communications Int'l Local 16-C, 
_03 ~b. Arb. (BNA) 1041 (1994) (Canestraight, Arb.) (although there was no accommodation 
qurrement in the collective bargaining agreement, union challenged termination of employee 
.h Wrist injury as without just cause because the employer did not accommodate her as re-
ed by the ADA). If the parties eliminated a nondiscrimination clause in negotiations, how-
r' the employer might argue that the parties intended to remove discrimination cases from 
tractual challenge under the just cause provision of the contract. See City of Flint and Lieu-
ants & Captains Ass'n, 97 Lab. Arb. (BNA) (1991) 1 (McDonald, Arb.) (use of bargaining 
or~ to establish intent of the parties). For a thorough discussion of recent arbitration awards 
lvtng disability issues, see Thomas E. Terrill, The Americans with Disabilities Act and Labor 
itration: Recent Awards, 48 LAB. L.J. 3 (1997). 
18. Ar~.ltration may provide a quicker, cheaper forum for hearing discrimination claims, 
e of which would not otherwise be litigated because of the time or cost. See Lisa B. Bingham, 
loyment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMPLOYEE RTS & EMPLOYMENT POL J. 
;·l89-90 (1997). For further discussion of the advantages of the arbitral forum, see Grodin, 
note 121, at 50-51; Turner, supra note 198, at 289-84. Choosing arbitration over litigation 
ave significant disadvantages, however. In addition to the absence of discovery, which may 
.the employee's ability to prove the claim, evidence suggests that monetary recovery is 
In arbitration than litigation. Bingham, supra, at 243. 
------'"'-~"~------··--·------·~ 
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be faced with conflicting employee desires with respect to the non-
discrimination provisions, creating potential division within the bar-
gaining unit. And bargaining unit divisions, of course, weaken the 
union's negotiating power. Moreover, even if all employees desired 
removal of contractual nondiscrimination provisions or opposed in-
clusion of them, it is highly unlikely that the issue would be a strike 
issue for a sufficient number of employees for the union to achieve 
its objective over employer opposition. 
Furthermore, in some cases arbitration might be the most ap-
propriate forum for finding an effective solution in a discrimination 
case. For example, in a dispute about reasonable accommodation 
under the ADA where the accommodation might conflict with the 
collective bargaining agreement, arbitration provides a forum where 
the contractual and statutory issues can be treated together."' Ac-
cordingly, while the absence of contractual agreement to arbitrate 
statutory rights may enable employees to litigate statutory claims, it 
may eliminate the right to arbitrate such claims in situations where 
arbitration would provide an adequate remedy. 
Another problem with this approach is the existence of case law 
finding failure to negotiate a nondiscrimination clause to be evidence 
of unlawful discrimination on the part of the union. In Macklin v. 
Spector Freight Systems, Inc., 220 for example, the court stated, albeit 
in dicta, that where the union has not negotiated protection from dis-
crimination for the employees and "there is such solid evidence of 
employer discrimination :'. . it would undermine Title VII's attempt 
to impose responsibility on both unions and employers to hold that 
union passivity at the negotiating table in such circumstances cannot 
constitute a violation of the Act. "221 Other courts have used an ef-
forts test in determining whether a union is liable under Title VII for 
discriminatory contract provisions, absolving the union only where it 
makes all reasonable efforts to eliminate discrimination.
222 
Under 
this test, failure to negotiate a nondiscrimination provision might in-
219. Rabin, supra note 201, at 248-49. For a discussion of the potential for conflict between 
accommodations under the ADA and the collective bargaining agreement, see Hodges, supra 
note 121, at 614-25. 
220. 478 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
221. Id. at 989. 
222. See, e.g., Howard v. International Molders & Allied Workers, Local 100, 779 F.2d 1546, 
1548 (11th Cir. 1986); Waker v. Republic Steel Corp., 675 F. 2d 91, 93 (5th Cir. 1982); Terrell v. 
United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 644 F.2d 1112, 1120-21 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted and 
judgment vacated on other grounds sub nom. International Molders & Allied Workers Union Lo-
cal 342 v. Terrell, 456 U.S. 968 (1982); Martinez v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 680 F. Supp. 1377, 
1397-98 (N.D. Cal. 1987). 
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crease the probability that the union will be held liable for unlawful 
discrimination. Accordingly, the union runs a risk when it fails to 
negotiate a nondiscrimination provision. If it seeks to eliminate an 
existing nondiscrimination provision, the risk might be even greater 
unless the court considering a discrimination claim was willing to 
recognize that the purpose of the union's action was to free employ-
ees to seek judicial resolution of discrimination cases."' 
B. Permitting Employees to Arbitrate Discrimination Claims 
A second alternative for dealing with this problem is to allow 
employees to arbitrate all discrimination claims at their own expense. 
As reflected in the cases discussed above, the employee has no right 
to insist on arbitration and no right to control arbitration, including 
no right to his or her own legal representative."' A union could 
agree to allow an employee to arbitrate his or her own case, how-
ever. Of course, this does not prov.ide the employee with the rights 
available in litigation, such as a jury trial and extensive discovery, but 
it does insure that the employee has a forum to hear the discrimina-
tion claim. Since unions cannot arbitrate every case, a union could 
decline to arbitrate a discrimination claim without breaching the duty 
of fair representation. When that decision deprives the employee of 
any opportunity for a hearing on a statutory claim, however, it com-
plicates the already difficult decision about which of the many griev-
ances filed to arbitrate. 
A decision not to arbitrate a discrimination claim has political 
implications for the union officers, who may be accused by the mem-
bers of discrimination. Member dissatisfaction may lead to political 
defeat of the officers or even decertification of the union.
225 
Fur-
223. Elimination of the nondiscrimination provision might equally be viewed as evidence that 
the union wanted to escape the responsibility of representing employees in the grievance proce-dur~ on nondiscrimination claims. A union taking this approach should clearly state the reason 
" for its position in the contract negotiations and keep careful records of the negotiations so that it c~ p:ove, if challenged, that its intent was to protect the employees' right to sue for statutory 
violations. 
224. See supra notes 143-60 and accompanying text. 2~5. The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act requires local unions to hold -~lections .of officers at least every three years. 29 U.S.C. § 48l(b) (1994). Decertification peti-
ns, w~ch must be supported by at least thirty percent of the employees in the bargaining unit, 
ay be ~le~ when no collective bargaining agreement is in effect or between 90 and 60 days be-~ exprration of the collective bargaining agreement. See, e.g., Leonard Wholesale Meats, Inc., 
. N.L.R.B. 1000 (1962); De Luxe Metal Furniture Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 995 (1958). No decertifi-
tion petition may be filed in the first year after certification of the union, however. Brooks v. 
RB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954). 
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thermore, the union may be sued for breach of the duty of fair repre-
sentation or charged with violating discrimination laws for failing to 
arbitrate a discrimination grievance."' While all of these risks exist 
for unions even in the absence of decisions binding employees to the 
union's grievance procedure for discrimination claims, the risk is ex-
acerbated when the union's decision deprives the employee of a 
hearing on his or her discrimination claim. 
Allowing the employee to arbitrate the grievance minimizes 
these risks, but does not eliminate them, and poses other difficulties 
for the union. The union maintains control over the grievance pro-
cedure for several reasons."' First, an incentive for employers to 
agree to grievance and arbitration procedures is the screening func-
tion performed by the union."' The employer is freed from having 
to deal with many employee complaints because the union deter-
mines that they do not rise to the level of contract violations or that 
its resources are better spent on more significant issues. Abandon-
ment of the screening function may discourage arbitration agree-
ments. 
Second, the arbitrator serves as contract reader for the parties"' 
determining what the contract means. Submission of a grievance to 
arbitration gives the arbitrator control over contract terms. Where 
the risk of an adverse determination is significant,
230 
the union can 
decline to arbitrate, preserving the right to assert its interpretation of 
the provision and to negotiate a satisfactory solution. Accordingly, 
giving up the right to dedde which grievances to arbitrate creates 
significant problems for the union. Allowing an employee to arbi-
trate with her own representative and make strategy decisions poses 
226. See Vaca, 386 U.S. at 186 (courts have jurisdiction of duty of fair representation claims); 
Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enf't denied, 326 F.2d 172 {2d Cir. 1963) (breach of 
the duty of fair representation is an unfair labor practice); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1994) 
(prohibiting discrimination by unions on the basis of race, gender, national origin and religion); 
42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (1994) (union is covered entity barred from discriminating under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act); 29 U.S.C. § 623{c) (1994) (prohibiting age discrimination by 
unions). 
227. Of course there is a financial reason for the union to retain control over decisions to ar-
bitrate because the union can afford to arbitrate only a limited number of cases. 
228. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 191-92. 
229. St. Antoine, supra note 10, at 1138-40. 
230. The risk may be great because of the facts underlying the grievance or because the con-
tractual interpretation argument of the union is weak. Alternatively, the risk may be great be-
cause an adverse decision would affect a large number of bargaining unit members. In the latter 
case, even if the chances of winning are more than even, the union may not want to risk an ad-
verse decision. In the former case, the union might prefer to wait for a case with better facts to 
challenge the company's interpretation of the contract. The axiom "hard cases make bad law" 
applies equally in grievance arbitration. 
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the same risks of adverse determination. The employee's attorney 
might choose to make arguments that undermine the union's posi-
tion in other cases. While these risks may not be as great for arbitra-
tion cases involving statutory discrimination claims, allowing em-
ployees to arbitrate discrimination cases but not other cases may 
make the union more vulnerable to duty of fair representation 
claims. At a minimum, the union would have to justify the differen-
tial treatment, which could be attacked as arbitrary or discriminatory 
or both.231 Additionally, there may be substantial overlap between 
contractual and statutory claims, making it impossible for the union 
to permit individual arbitration of statutory claims only."' 
Finally, allowing the employee to arbitrate may not accomplish 
the desired result because the expense may be prohibitive. Given 
the lack of discovery and the absence of a jury in arbitration,"' the 
employee may be unable to find an attorney to represent her on a 
231. See Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190. This differe~tial treabnent might also be challenged as viola~ 
tive of antidiscrimination laws. For example, an African-American female employee terminated 
for absenteeism who challenged the termination as discriminatory would be able to arbitrate her 
claim even if the union determined not to arbitrate. A white 1nale employee terminated for ab-
senteeism who challenged his termination as without just cause, but made no statutory discri1ni-
nation clai1n, would be bound by the union's decision not to arbitrate. The potential for discrimi-
nation claims against the union is obvious, not to mention the potential for political backlash 
against the union and racial and gender division within the union's membership. While such divi-
sion may, at first blush, appear to be beneficial to the employer-united we stand, divided we·· 
fall-the resulting disruption may affect productivity as well as make it difficult for the union to 
negotiate a satisfactory collective bargaining agreement, leading to unnecessary labor strife. 
232. For example, a termination could be challenged as without just cause under the collec-
tive bargaining agreement and also discriminatory in violation of one of the discrimination stat-
utes. The challenge to just cause might be based not only on discrimination, but on other factors 
such as lack of due process or lack of notice that conduct the employee engaged in was prohib-
ited. 
233. Furthermore, it is not clear that an arbitrator under a collective bargaining agreement, 
even one that incorporated statutory clai1ns, would feel free to award compensatory or punitive 
damages absent express authorization from the parties, since such damages are not generally 
awarded in labor arbitration. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 162, at 589-92 (noting that 
punitive damages are generally not awarded unless clearly justified and compensatory damages 
are usually make whole awards such as back pay). Even where such damages are clearly 
a_uthorized, monetary awards are generally lower in arbitration than jury awards in discrimina-
tto~ cases, further reducing the likelihood that the attorney would take the case on a contingency 
basis. See William M. Howard, Arbitrating Claims of Employ1nent Discrimination: What Really 
Does Happen? What Really Should flappen?, DISP. RESOL. J., Oct.-Dec. 1995 at 40, 45 (citing 
study which found that mean and median jury verdicts in litigated employment discrimination 
;;. cases were three times higher than awards in arbitrated discrimination cases). In cases where no 
;.: .. back pay is involved, such as harassment, the problem would be even more acute. See Bales, su-
, _pra note 121, at 740. The same is true for awarding attorneys' fees to successful plaintiffs. See 
ELKOU~I & ELKOURI, supra note 162, at 592 ("it is not customary practice to award attorney 
fees agamst the offending party in arbitration."); 2 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 203, at 
i859-61 (citing statutory authority for awarding attorneys fees to prevailing plaintiffs). Inability 
to c?llect attorneys' fees from the employer is likely to discourage many attorneys from reprc-
ntmg plaintiffs in discrimination cases. 
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contingency basis. And it is unlikely that an employee covered by a 
collective bargaining agreement would have sufficient income or as-
sets to hire an experienced attorney on an hourly basis."' Thus, this 
option, even if chosen by the union, which is unlikely, would, in all 
probability, not effectuate the purposes of the laws prohibiting dis-
crimination. 
C. Union Assistance with Litigation or Voluntary Arbitration 
The rapid growth of statutory rights in the workplace has led to 
suggestions that unions can assist employees in the enforcement of 
these statutory rights.235 The Fourth Circuit's decisions force this role 
on the union to the detriment of both employees and unions. Un-
ions can support employees in either litigation or voluntary arbitra-
tion of statutory claims, however. Unions have access to information 
with respect to employer policies and practices and treatment of 
similarly situated employees, which may assist employees challenging 
discriminatory treatment."' Unions also can identify potential wit-
nesses that may support an employee's claim and encourage them to 
testify. In addition, the presence of a union-negotiated just cause 
provision for termination or discipline provides protection to em-
ployees against retaliation for their testimony. Unions can provide 
this assistance whether the employee chooses to litigate or arbitrate. 
While there has been substantial criticism of mandatory arbitra-
tion of statutory claims, particularly where employees are required to 
agree to arbitration as a condition of employment, truly voluntary 
arbitration has met with less criticism."' A procedure that provides 
employees with the option of arbitration and allows the choice to be 
made at the time the dispute arises does not involve the coercion that 
234. William M. Howard, Arbitrating Employment Discrimination Claims: Do You Really 
l-lave To? Do You Really Want To?, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 256, 289 (1994) (indicating that even a 
retainer of $2500---:..$5000 is a bar to obtaining representation). On the other hand, it has been 
suggested that legal representation in arbitration might be more affordable because the time ex-
penditure would be limited. Id. 
235. Rabin, supra note 201, at 171-72. Professor Clyde Summers has suggested that statutory 
remedies may be ineffective where employees have no union representation because the em-
ployer has "dominant authority in the workplace, greater knowledge, larger resources," and is a 
repeat player in the enforcement process. Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies for E1nployrnenl 
Rights: Preliminary Guidelines and Proposals, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 457, 543-44 (1992). 
236. Where similarly situated employees of a different race or gender are treated differently, 
an employee would have a claim of disparate treatment in violation of Title VII. See 1 
LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 203, at 10 (citing McAlester v. United Air Lines, Inc. 851 
F.2d 1249, 1261 (10th Cir. 1988) (where nonwhite employees were disciplined more harshly than 
white employees.)). 
237. See authorities cited supra note 166. 
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is present, if implicit, where the employee is asked (or certainly re-
quired) to agree to arbitration upon hiring or even while employed, 
but before any dispute arises."' In the collective bargaining setting, 
the problem is not individual coercion, but the lack of individual 
choice. Since the union is the employee's collective bargaining rep-
resentative, she cannot negotiate a separate agreement with the em-
ployer; she is bound by the union's contract."' If the union's nego-
tiation of a prohibition on discrimination which is subject to the 
grievance and arbitration procedure bars litigation, the employee's 
rights have been waived solely by virtue of her representation by a 
union. This is true regardless of whether she is a union member, re-
gardless of whether she supported the contract, regardless of 
whether the union had any knowledge that it was waiving individual 
employee rights by negotiating protection against discrimination, and 
regardless of whether the protection negotiated by the union is ade-
, quate.240 
Even if the employee cannot l:le forced to arbitrate under the 
collective bargaining agreement, she may choose voluntarily to arbi-
trate her discrimination claim after it arises."1 If she does so, the 
union can support litigation of the claim in the arbitral forum by 
providing information to the employee that would support her claim. 
Moreover, the presence of union representation may help alleviate 
the concerns raised by the fact that the employer will be a repeat 
player in arbitration while the employee will not.242 The employee 
See Grodin, supra note 121, at 38, 
239. See Malin, supra note 92, at 87. 
240. See supra notes 167, 183-85 and accompanying text.' 
241. If the employer has a procedure for arbitration of statutory claims for nonunion employ-
-: __ eys, it could be made available on an optional basis to union employees. For the union to rec-
, __ommend the procedure to bargaining unit members, however, it would have to be convinced that 
-~e procedure provided a fair and effective forum for statutory claims. Several groups have at-
pted to set forth guidelines for fair and effective arbitration of statutory disputes. See, e.g., 
ototype Agreement, supra note 161, at E-11 (setting forth the Due Process Protocol for Media-
n and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of the Employment Relationship pre-
:~red by the Task Force on Alternative Dispute Resolution in Employment); The Committee on 
_::~bor And Employment Law, Final Report on Model Rules for the Arbitration of Employment 
',tsputes, so RECORD OF THE Ass'N OFTIIE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 629 (1995) (setting forth 
odel Procedures for the Resolution of Employment Disputes prepared by the Committee La-
r and Employment Law of the New York bar). The Due Process Protocol has been endorsed 
_the Board of Governors of the National Academy of Arbitrators and by union and manage-
t representatives of the Employment and Labor Law Section of the Ainerican Bar Associa-
. Academy Board Endorses ADR Task Force Protocol, 149 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 6 at 
b
(June 5, 1995); ABA Approves ADR Proces1:; Protocol, 154 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 209 
ruary 24, 1997). 
42. See Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1475-76 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Bingham, 
,a note 218, at 192-93. Bingham's study demonstrated statistically significant reductions in 
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may be disadvantaged by a lack of familiarity with the arbitration 
procedure and lack of information about arbitrators, so that a role in 
selecting the arbitrator may be relatively useless.
243 
In addition, the 
arbitrator may have an economic incentive, conscious or uncon-
scious, to satisfy the employer because the employer is a source of 
future business for the arbitrator.
244 
The union can help reduce these disadvantages.
245 
The union 
could collect information about arbitrators and make it available to 
employees. The potential for repeated use by unionized employees, 
with the union available as a vehicle for sharing information about 
arbitrators, should help counteract any repeat customer bias favoring 
the employer."' The union could maintain a data bank of arbitration 
decisions, information about arbitrators, and perhaps even a list of 
attorneys in the area that represent employees in discrimination 
cases. Moreover, the presence of the union in the workplace and the 
collective bargaining agreement limiting termination provides pro-
tection for employees who might be subject to retaliation."' 
employee success in nonunion arbitration where the employer was a repeat player. See id. at 213. 
Bingham notes that the study does not establish a cause of the repeat player phenomenon. Id. at 
214. 243. See Lisa R. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: Differences between Repeat Player and 
Nonrepeat Player Outcomes, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-NINTH ANNUAL MEETING, IN-
DUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION 201, 202, 207 (1997) (noting that repeat player 
employers have the advantage of institutional memory which leads to informed arbitrator selec-
tion) ·• 244. See Estreicher, supra note 126, at 764; Peter M. Panken, et al., Avoiding Employment 
Litigation: Alternative Dispute Resolution of Employment Disputes in the 90's, 53 ALl-ABA 
(LEXIS, CLE Library, ALl-ABA file) (1996) (noting that an arbitrator must be fair to major 
clients which are employers in the nonunion context); AAA President Predicts Upswing in Use of 
ADR, Individual Employment Rights (BNA) 3 (July 20, 1993) (noting concern for repeat cus-
tomer bias); Bingham, supra note 243, at 207-08 (empirical study in which only two employers 
who used the same arbitrator in multiple cases won all of their cases, a "troublesome trend ... 
which bears watching."). 
245. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1475-76. 
246. Bingham, supra note 243, at 196-97, 219. Bingham suggests that unions could provide 
limited membership to employees at unrepresented workplaces and offer representation in e1n-
ployment arbitration as a benefit. Id. at 219. 
247. Although retaliation is unlawful under Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA, lengthy 
procedures and the difficulty of proof may make arbitration under a just cause provision a more 
valuable remedy. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (1994); 29 U.S.C. § 12203 (1994); 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) 
(1994). Ninety-seven percent of collective b~rgaining agreements require cause or just cause for 
discipline and discharge. See COOPER & NOLAN, supra note 200, at 87' citing BASIC PATTERNS 
IN UNION CONTRACTS (13th ed. 1992). Furthermore, the union may protect against more subtle 
forms of retaliation. See Julius G. Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE 
L.J. 916, 923, 934-36 (1979); Martha West, The Case Against Reinstatement in Wrongful Dis-
charge, 1988 lJ. ILL. L. REV. 1, 39-40 (reinstatement has been most successful as a remedy in Ja-
bot-arbitration because the presence of the union and the grievance and arbitration process dis-
sipates the fear of employer retaliation). 
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If, as is likely without a formal procedure, few employees choose 
to arbitrate, the union's ability and incentive to collect information 
about arbitration will be limited. Employees with statutory claims 
might be more likely to choose to arbitrate claims if the union were 
more extensively involved in the arbitration procedure. The union 
could play a greater role by negotiating a procedure for knowing and 
voluntary post-claim arbitration of statutory claims if it determined 
that it would benefit the employees."' The employer would have an 
incentive to agree to such a procedure as it might encourage employ-
ees to arbitrate rather than litigate, an option clearly preferable to at 
least some employers given the proliferation of arbitration provisions 
in the nonunion setting.249 
Because of the risk of duty of fair representation claims, how-
ever, this option may have little appeal for unions. Even the limited 
role of collecting and disseminating to all employees information 
about arbitrators and the arbitral process may expose the union to 
allegations that it has not fairly provided assistance to a particular 
individual. Going beyond this role by recommending arbitrators or 
providing information about particular employer practices or possi-
ble witnesses increases the risk that the union may be perceived to be 
providing more assistance to certain employees or recommending in-
ferior arbitrators. Involvement in the negotiation of the procedure 
increases the likelihood that the duty of fair representation would be 
applied to the union's role.250 
It can be argued that if the union negotiates an arbitration pro-
cedure and it is available to employees to use at their option, then it 
should be covered by the duty of fair representation. Statutory dis, 
248. Further consideration of several issues would be necessary were such a procedure to be 
negotiated. For example, where contractual and statutory issues overlap, which procedure would 
b_e used? One possibility would be to require the employee to choose. Because of the disincen-~1ve of the duty of fair representation, however, negotiation of such a procedure is unlikely. See 
infra notes 250-57 and accompanying text. 
249. See supra note 214 and accompanying text. 
. 2~0. Negotiation of a separate arbitration procedure might have another downside. If dis-
cnmination claims are litigated under the contractual grievance procedure, the union is entitled 
to information that is relevant and necessary to process the grievances. See NLRB v. Acme In-
dus. Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967). Thus the union could aid the employee in obtaining some discov-
ery relevant to the discrimination claim by requesting information. The employer might argue 
that the union was not entitled to the information for use in a noncontractual grievance proce-
dure .. The NLRB has held, however, that the union is entitled to data relating to the demo-
j--_ , g.raphic. makeup of the employer's workforce, EEOC charges against the employer, and affirma-h~e ~ction plans, where the union sought the information for the express purpose of bringing a /;-,cij.s~n~ination suit against the employer. See Westinghouse Blee. Corp., 239 N.L.R.B. 106 (1978), ~nf din part, 648 F2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Accordingly, data should be equally available for use 
>-_m an arbitration procedure limited to statutory claims. 
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crimination claims relate to employment and the union should repre-
sent all employees fairly even when it comes to statutory claims. 
The better argument, however, is that a voluntary arbitration 
procedure for statutory claims is an alternative to litigation which 
does not implicate the duty of fair representation. Courts have not 
found a union duty to litigate on behalf of employees to remedy dis-
crimination."' A procedure available only for statutory claims would 
be analogous to litigation. The duty of fair representation arises out 
of the right of exclusive representation."' Since the employee's 
statutory rights are independent of the union, the union is not the 
employee's exclusive representative for statutory claims. In a similar 
context, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the 
union did not have a duty with respect to its decision about whether 
to ask a court to vacate an arbitration award.
253 
The court found that 
since the right to ask a court to vacate an arbitration award was not 
exclusive to the union, the union had no duty to the employees with 
respect to that decision."' The employee himself was free to ask the 
court to vacate the award. Unfortunately, not all courts have agreed 
with the Seventh Circuit and there is no certainty that the duty would 
not be applied in the context of voluntary arbitration of statutory 
claims.255 If the duty of fair representation does not apply, unions could be 
far more active in assisting employees in arbitration without fear of 
liability. Refusal to app\y the duty of fair representation would not 
leave employees wholly without a remedy for union misconduct, 
·however. If the union actively discriminated against employees, an 
action could be brought against the union under the appropriate dis-
crimination statute.256 In the absence of a fair representation duty, 
however, the union could offer a service to its members by providing 
legal counsel in discrimination cases.257 This additional benefit of 
251. See MALIN, supra note 185, at 414. 
252. See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S.192 (1944). 
253. Freeman v. Local Union 135, Teamsters, 746F.2d1316, 1320 (7th Cir.1984). 
254. Id. at 1321. 255. See Sear v. Cadillac Automobile Co., 654 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 198l)(declining to hold that 
failure to seek vacation of an arbitration award could never breach the duty of fair representa-
tion, but stating that an action should lie, if at all, only when there was blatant unfairness on the 
part of the union). 256. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1994) (prohibiting discrimination by unions on the basis ol 
race, gender, national origin and religion); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (1994) (union is covered entity 
prohibited from discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act); 29 U.S.C. § 623(c) 
(1994) (prohibiting age discrhnination by unions). 257. As noted previously, however, if the union discriminated in providing attorneys on the 
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union membership could encourage employees in right to work 
states to join the union. The union would benefit through additional 
members and the employees would benefit through more effective 
enforcement of discrimination statutes. The union could also provide 
more active assistance to employees in arbitration, such as guidance 
in arbitration techniques and strategy based on union experience, 
without fear of liability. 
Because of uncertainty about the application of the duty of fair 
representation, however, voluntary arbitration does not provide an 
effective alternative for enforcement of statutory rights for the un-
ionized employee or the union. The union cannot provide effective 
assistance or participate in creating a procedure without risking a 
breach of the duty of fair representation. At most, the union could 
collect and provide information, available to all employees, should 
employees voluntarily choose to arbitrate their claims after a dispute 
has arisen. 
. 
V. THE ROLE OF UNIONS IN STATUTORY DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS 
Involvement of unions in statutory discrimination claims may 
further the objectives of discrimination statutes by providing individ-
ual employees with litigation (or arbitration) assistance, improving 
the ability of discriminatees to find lawyers to handle their claims,"' 
and providing a screening function to discourage nonmeritorious 
Claims."' Such involvement should not be coerced through forcing 
such claims into the contractual grievance procedure, however. Such 
au approach works to the detriment of the statutory objectives of 
· both the NLRA and the discrimination statutes. The union is en-
couraged either to deprive employees of the statutory litigation fo-
rum or to eliminate any contractual protection against discrimina-
tion, removing the union from any role other than litigating itself or 
assisting employees with litigation. If, in fact, arbitration is a viable 
alternative for discrimination claims, it should be encouraged as an 
;· Pasis of union membership where the duty of fair representation applied, it would most likely be 
qund to have violated that duty. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. Because of the cost 
P.f attorney representation, this would be a substantial benefit, but one which the union could not 
,;iff0 rd to provide to all employees. See Rabin, supra note 201, at 203. 
····: 25.8 .. Se~ Howard, supra note 234, at 288 (obtaining counsel is difficult for many employment 
sc;rurunatlon plaintiffs). 
· -:~9 .. Unions provide such a screening function for contractual claims under the grievance and 
ration procedure, a fact which has encouraged the negotiation and use of such procedures. 
Vaca, 386 U.S. at 191-92. 
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option, with the availability of union support.260 Application of the 
duty of fair representation t~ such a procedure would discourage 
unions from negotiating or participating in a voluntary arbitration 
procedure. While there is a persuasive argument that the duty 
should not apply, the uncertainty of its application will have a dis-
couraging effect on unions, limiting their involvement. Accordingly, 
a legislative declaration that the union's duty of fair representation 
does not apply to statutory claims might be necessary to encourage 
voluntary arbitration by unionized employees. At present, voluntary 
arbitration is not a viable alternative unless individually chosen by an 
employee represented by counsel to resolve a discrimination claim 
after it has arisen. 
VI. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD REVERSE WRIGHT 
For all of the reasons set forth above, the Supreme Court should 
reverse the Fourth Circuit's decision in Wright and hold that unions 
cannot prospectively waive employee rights under the discrimination 
statutes by negotiating nondiscrimination provisions in a collective 
bargaining agreement or a broad grievance and arbitration provision. 
While it might be argued that employees should be required to arbi-
trate under the collective bargaining agreement prior to filing suit,"' 
the requirement that employees exhaust the grievance and arbitra-
tion procedure before filing a suit for breach of the collective bar-
gaining agreement is inapposite here. The requirement serves the 
salutary purpose of encouraging arbitration of labor disputes and 
limiting judicial involvement in contract interpretation."' Thus it fur-
thers the NLRA's goal of encouraging collective bargaining."' Re-
quiring exhaustion of statutory claims does not further that purpose. 
Instead, it serves as a trap for the unwary employee who unknow-
ingly fails to file a grievance. In addition, the employee who files a 
grievance may neglect to file a timely EEOC charge while waiting for 
resolution through the grievance procedure, thereby losing her 
260. Several commentators have suggested some form of legislated system for arbitration of 
some or all employment discrimination claims. While consideration of the merits of such a sys-
tem is beyond the scope of this article, were such a system to be implemented, unions could play 
an important role in supporting employees if their support were not circumscribed by the duty of 
fair representation. For such proposals, see Grodin, supra note 121, at 55; Ann C. McGinley, 
Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment at Will: Toward a Coherent Discharge Policy, 51 OHIO 
ST. L.l. 1443, 1515 (1996). 
261. Austin, 78 F.3d at 885. 
262. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653, 656 (1965). 
263. Id. at 653. 
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claim."" The purposes of the nondiscrimination statutes are not 
served by procedures and traps that make it more difficult for em-
ployees, who are often unsophisticated, to enforce their rights. 
Exhaustion requires the employee to use what may prove to be 
an ineffective forum for statutory claims because of the employee's 
lack of control over the procedure, which merely adds to the em-
ployee's burden in attempting to remedy discriminatory treatment."' 
While the employee may vindicate her rights in arbitration, given the 
limitations on union resources, it is more likely that the exhaustion 
requirement will merely delay resolution of the dispute. 
If the union does not arbitrate, the courts will have to determine 
whether to hear the claim de novo or, as in the case of contractual 
claims, reach the merits only if the employee can prove that the un-
ion breached its duty of fair representation, thereby excusing the 
failure to exhaust.266 If the latter rule applies, then the employee's 
claim will, in all likelihood, never be heard.267 If the union arbitrates 
and loses or wins less than the full remedy that would be available 
under the statute, a judicial action may still be filed. The Supreme 
Court in Gardner-Denver declined to defer to the arbitrator's deci-
sion in the litigation of the statutory claim.268 If that view prevails 
and it should for reasons set forth in the opinion and this article, the 
arbitration has merely postponed resolution of the dispute."' If not, 
courts will have to determine the appropriate level of deference to 
the arbitrator's decision.'70 Thus, the exhaustion requirement has lit-
tle to recommend it as it creates many of the same problems as a 
264. See International Union Elec. Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229 (1976) 
(filing of grievance under collective bargaining agreement does not toll statute of limitations) . 
265. See supra notes 141-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of the concerns about the 
effectiveness of the forum. 
266. See Vaca, 386 U.S. at 186; Moore v. Duke Power, 971 F. Supp. at 982. 
267. See supra notes 157-61 and accompanying text. 
268. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 57-58. ::~:, 2?9. It is possible that this approach will give an employee "two bites at the apple,'' to the 
detriment of the employer, and perhaps the judicial system, because of the expenditure of re-
·;sources on dual litigation of claims. It is likely, however, that few employees will actually be able 
· ..to both arbitrate their claim under the collective bargaining agreement and litigate the claim in ,,c.o~t. First, the union will not arbitrate most cases and second, many employees will not actually 
tlgate either because of lack of resources, inability to find an attorney, or other reasons. At 
os.t, employees may file a charge with the EEOC, which requires an employer response but is ~r less costly than litigation. And even under Gilmer, an enforceable arbitration agreement does 
.IJt preclude an EEOC charge. 500 U.S. at 28. ~70. If, as has been suggested, see supra note 196 and accompanying text, judicial review of 
bi~ra}- decisions on statutory claims is less deferential, the efficiency gains from exhaustion may 
limited. See also Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 59 (suggesting de nova review); Rios v. Rey-
Metals Co., 467 F.2d 54, 58 (5th Cir.1972) (setting deferral standard). 
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complete bar to litigation. Accordingly, the Court should conclude 
that collectively-bargained arbitration provisions have no impact on 
statutory discrimination rights. 
VII. CONCLUSJON 
While unions can play an effective role in eliminating discrimi-
nation from the workplace, employees should not be deprived of a 
judicial forum for discrimination claims by virtue of their coverage 
by a collective bargaining agreement. Labor arbitration has served 
as an important element of national labor policy, furthering peaceful 
settlement of disputes between employers and unions. Labor arbi-
tration was not designed to achieve the goals of antidiscrimination 
legislation, however, and imposing that burden will interfere with the 
goals of both labor policy and antidiscrimination statutes. The Su-
preme Court should reverse the Fourth Circuit's Wright decision, 
holding that individual statutory nondiscrimination rights cannot be 
waived by the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement. If ar-
bitration is truly a viable option for statutory claims, Congress should 
consider a legislative approach, including a provision barring the ap-
plication of the duty of fair representation to arbitration of statutory 
claims. 
